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ABSTRACT
This Article argues that there are two traditions in American free speech
scholarship that result in two opposing speech doctrines, but that American
law students are exposed to only one of them. Of the two traditions, one de-
rives its doctrine from the most significant media in society-such as broad-
cast, cable, the internet, and other electronic media. The other derives its doc-
trine from society's more marginal communications media-such as leaflets,
pickets, soapboxes, and burning flags. Yet, for no good historical reason, the
doctrine derived from burning flags and other marginal media takes center
stage in law school casebooks, while the doctrine derived from significant
media is ignored and harshly criticized.
The two speech doctrines are not identical. They would lead to different
results in many significant speech controversies, especially those involving
speech through current and evolving electronic media. The two doctrines also
have different animating concerns. The major concern of the doctrine derived
from electronic media is a distrust of government action where the action
diminishes the diversity of viewpoints and the wide distribution of speech
power. The animating concern of the other doctrine, however, is a distrust of
"any" government action directed at speech.
This Article demonstrates that constitutional and First Amendment case-
books and treatises largely ignore electronic media cases even though
electronic media are Americans' primary speech media, and even though, in
practice, speech doctrine derives from such cases. These books devote very
little space to broadcast, cable, the internet, and the telephone, while focusing
most of their attention on less significant media like burning flags and soap-
boxes. Moreover, in the brief space that these law books devote to electronic
media cases, they imply the cases were wrongly decided and they privilege
the decisions on insignificant media. In the process, law students' books push
one conception of free speech doctrine, derived from marginal media, at the
expense of another, derived from society's most widely used media.
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The following quotation favorably compares speech through posters on
utility poles to speech through broadcast television:
The mass media are not invariably the most effective means of
communication. For example, the right to place messages on utility
poles concerning a lost dog may be more important than access to
a radio or a television station.'
This comes from the 2001 edition of a widely-used constitutional law
casebook. It begins a 47-page section on electronic media in a chapter on
freedom of expression that devotes its other 419 pages to pamphleteering,
pornography, obscenity, flag and draft card burning, utility pole postings,
fighting words, libel, advocacy of illegal action, commercial advertising, rac-
ist or hate speech repeatedly (e.g., section four: "Hate Speech Revisited-
Again"), defamation, licensing leafleteers, arts funding, speech by govern-
ment employees, parades, billboards, etc.2 Although some of the other topics
involve electronic media, the section devoted specifically to electronic media
fills only 10 percent of the chapter's pages, in a section beginning with the
above caveat.
These apparently peculiar lines and emphasis are, for law casebooks, not
peculiar. They are emblematic. This Article demonstrates that 80 to 90 per-
cent of free-speech material in constitutional and First Amendment casebooks
and treatises focuses on non-electronic speech. When they present electronic
speech cases, the law books criticize and marginalize them. By contrast, elec-
tronic media are Americans' primary communication media: the Supreme
Court has repeatedly noted the pervasiveness of electronic media,3 and the
Justices understand that "[m]inds are not changed in the streets and parks as
they once were," but through "mass and electronic media."3
4
Ignoring and marginalizing electronic media cases gives students a
skewed view of free speech doctrine. Cases involving electronic media pro-
vide a much different conception of free speech doctrine than do many of the
cases emphasized in law books. As a result, students learn one conception of
doctrine at the expense of another, and fail to explore the conception that
animates cases centered on influential communications media.
This theoretical debate has enormous normative and regulatory implica-
tions for the emerging communications environment. For example, the two
1. JESSE H. CHOPER E7 AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES-CoMMENTs-QuESTIONs
915 (9th ed. 2001).
2. Id. at xx-xxvii.
3. See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
4. Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 802-03
(1996) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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speech conceptions would result in different laws for issues such as'high-
speed internet delivery, media concentration, and spectrum allocation.
Meanwhile, current scholarly and public conceptions of constitutional doc-
trine help shape the conceptions of sitting judges and policy-makers.5 Current
law students eventually will become law professors, lawyers, law clerks,
judges, and policy makers. The dominant doctrinal conception of speech will
help shape American communications, in established and emerging media,
perhaps for generations to come. Nonetheless, the law curriculum advances
one side of this constitutional debate.
This Article has three main Parts. The first Part plots the differences be-
tween the two speech doctrines by examining the doctrines' scholarly tradi-
tions. For at least four decades, scholars have understood this central doc-
trinal debate. The second Part presents data demonstrating that American free
speech occurs largely through electronic media, not through pamphlets,
newspapers, picketing, hate-speaking, etc. The third Part quantitatively and
qualitatively analyzes a sample of constitutional and First Amendment trea-
tises and casebooks used at the "top ten" law schools. This Article concludes
that, despite electronic media's social impact, the law books devote little
space to electronic media, and, within that space, they strongly favor the doc-
trine of non-electronic media.
I. THE SECOND TRADITION OF FREE SPEECH
A. Two "Well-Established" Traditions
There are not only two sides to a free speech argument, there are two
coexisting, equally old traditions of scholarship and Supreme Court decisions.
The distinction between the traditions is obvious in certain cases. In
1969, the Supreme Court determined the constitutionality of the FCC's fair-
ness doctrine in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC.6 The fairness doctrine
required broadcasters to provide response time to those who weathered per-
sonal attacks and to those with opposing views when one side of a controver-
sial public issue was aired.7 The Supreme Court ruled unanimously that the
rule did not unconstitutionally burden broadcasters' speech.
5. See, e.g., MARK.A. GRABER, TRANSFORMING FREE SPEECH: THE AMBIGUOUS
LEGACY OF CIvIL LIBERTARIANISM 122-64 (1991) (chronicling Zechariah Chafee's contri-
butions to free speech doctrine); Judge Alex Kozinski, Who Gives a Hoot About Legal
Scholarship?, 37 Hous. L. REv. 295 (2000). See also Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and
Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REv. 1405, 1405 (1986) (noting that a perceived "[tiradition
is the background against which every judge writes") [hereinafter, Fiss, Free Speech].
6. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
7. See Yochai Benkler, Free Markets vs. Free Speech: A Resilient Red Lion and its
Critics, 8 INT'L J.L. & INFO. TECH. 214, 215 (2000) (reviewing RATIONALES AND
RATIONALIZATIONS, REGULATING THE ELECTRONIC MEDIA (Robert Corn-Revere ed.,
1997)) [hereinafter Benkler, Resilient].
[Vol. 70
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Before the case, however, First Amendment scholars submitted amici
briefs supporting the broadcasters' position, not the Supreme Court's eventual
unanimous decision.8 Years later, in 1987, the FCC agreed with those speech
scholars. It abandoned the fairness doctrine, claiming the doctrine "cannot be
reconciled with well-established constitutional precedent." 9 With this state-
ment, the FCC ignored the well-established constitutional precedent, called
Red Lion, that had already upheld the doctrine at issue, and privileged other
"well-established constitutional precedent" which did not involve the rule at
issue, broadcast, or electronic media.
Free speech scholars have long understood a schism between the line of
cases and commentary centering on Red Lion and other electronic media
cases, and the line of cases comprising what the FCC called "well-established
constitutional precedent," largely focusing on leaflets, pickets, and burning
flags. Scholars have argued, agreeing with the FCC, that the two lines of
cases are irreconcilable.' 0 The FCC could ignore Red Lion largely because it
chose one "well-established" line over another well-established line derived
from electronic media.
The traditions are about the same age. Electronic media cases and regu-
lation did not mark "new" exceptions to "well-established" doctrine. Early
leaflet and street comer cases include Abrams v. United States," decided in
1919, important for its dissent and not for its law, 12 and Near v. Minnesota,
3
decided in 1931. Meanwhile, broadcast regulation began with the first Federal
Radio Act in 1912.14 The Federal Radio Commission was established in
1927,15 and it became the Federal Communications Commission in 1934.16
The most revered non-electronic-media cases--such as New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan' 7 in 1964, and Brandenburg v. Ohio, which essentially protected
8. See Fiss, Free Speech, supra note 5, at 1416.
9. See, e.g., Jonathan Weinberg, Broadcasting and Speech, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1 101,
1003 (1993) (internal quotations omitted).
10. Lee Bollinger refers to "opposing constitutional traditions regarding the press."
Lee C. Bollinger, Jr., Freedom of the Press and Public Access: Toward a Theory of Par-
tial Regulation of the Mass Media, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1, 1 (1976-1977). Cass Sunstein
states simply that "[t]here are two free speech traditions,... not simply one." Cass R.
Sunstein, The First Amendment in Cyberspace, 104 YALE L.J. 1757, 1759 (1995). See also
OWEN M. Fiss, THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH 70-74 (1996); CAss R. SUNSTEIN,
DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 28 (1993); Weinberg, supra note 9.
11. 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
12. That same year, the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously approved of imprisoning a
then-popular political figure for giving a speech against the military draft. J.M. Balkin, The
Canons of Constitutional Law, 111 HARv. L. REV. 963, 978 n.52 (discussing Debs v.
United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919)).
13. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
14. Radio Act of 1912, Pub. L. No. 62-264, 37 Stat. 302 (repealed 1927).
15. Radio Act of 1927, Pub. L. No. 69-632,44 Stat. 1162.
16. Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652,48 Stat. 1064.
17. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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street comer speech, in 1969-were decided more than thirty years after the
FCC's founding. In fact, the Court decided Red Lion the same year it decided
Brandenburg.
It also decided Red Lion five years before Miami Herald Publishing Co.
v. Tornillo.19 Tornillo involved issues nearly identical to Red Lion but applied
to newspapers. The Court in Tornillo surprisingly held the nearly identical
law unconstitutional, notwithstanding Red Lion, and did not even cite Red
Lion. The later case, Tornillo, became the scholars' "traditional" rule, while
20the older case became the "new" media exception.
So as speech doctrine developed, many speech scholars segregated these
cases by forming a perceived doctrinal "core" of "traditional" cases (which
were not "traditional") and a doctrinal "periphery" of "new media." As a gen-
eral rule in law scholarship, "core" cases receive broad interpretations; "pe-
ripheral" cases receive narrow interpretations, and often are presumptively
limited to their facts. In addition, the "core" determines how one views and
interprets the periphery; the core determines what is central to those periph-
eral cases. In one scholarly speech tradition, the core includes leaflets, hate
speech, and newspapers, while the periphery includes broadcast and other
electronic media. The second speech tradition places electronic media in the
core with other speech cases.
B. Terms
Here, I call the tradition with a leaflet-core the "paper tradition,",2' partly
to emphasize its doctrinal emphasis on speech's medium and its preference
for many of the cases that involve paper. The scholars writing in this tradi-
tion, and the cases they emphasize, are animated by one primary theme: the
unwavering distrust of government. In many ways, it is a "worthy tradi-
tion, a "triumph '  of "the Constitution's most majestic guarantee. 24 In
theory, its core doctrine protects street comer speakers and pamphleteers
18. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
19. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
20. C. Edwin Baker, Turner Broadcasting: Content-based Regulation of Persons and
Presses, 1994 SuP. CT. REV. 57, 104.
21. Weinberg, supra note 9, at 1131 (arguing that broadcast doctrine "conflicts in
almost every respect, and gratuitously so, with conventional freedom-of-speech philoso-
phy").
22. HARRY KALVEN, JR., A WORTHY TRADITION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN AMERICA
(Jamie Kalven ed. 1988).
23. SuNSTEIN, supra note 10, at 14.
24. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 785 (2d ed. 1988).
Free speech protections have not amassed, however, but have rather "ebb[ed] and
flow[ed]." See Lee C. Bollinger & Geoffrey R. Stone, Dialogue, in ETERNALLY VIGILANT:
FREE SPEECH IN THE MODERN ERA 1, 3 (Lee C. Bollinger & Geoffrey R. Stone eds., 2002).
[Vol. 70
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from content-based government interference. 25 But its advocates lament that
its doctrine does not extend to electronic media, which receive what they call
"less" speech freedom. 26 They have long attacked Red Lion's reasoning and
emphasize that, to the extent Red Lion may have once been relevant to broad-
cast, it should never extend to anything outside of broadcast.
I call the second tradition the "communication tradition." It focuses on
speech as it occurs in modem society-largely through electronic media-
and on individuals' actual power to communicate.2 7 Its primary aim is speech
diversity, not government distrust. It differs from the paper tradition on sev-
eral points based on one primary doctrinal disagreement. Unlike paper tradi-
tion, it permits government constitutional leeway to adopt structural regula-
tions that foster "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" public debate and ad-
vance social values like viewpoint diversity and localism. 28 So it does not
have the same unrelenting government distrust which would cripple govern-
ment's leeway to distribute speech power. As a result, this tradition has sev-
eral other conflicts with paper tradition. It does not focus on the technological
particulars of a medium to limit to that medium a particular case it dislikes.
C. Scholars
Since the late 1940s, scholars have analyzed socially significant free
speech decisions and laws and concluded that the speech doctrine of mass and
electronic media differs from the doctrine of leaflets. Many of their major
themes have, in fact, remained unchanged over the years.
Zechariah Chafee, a father of the paper tradition,29 also helped father the
communication tradition. 30 In 1947, twenty-two years before Red Lion, he
25. See Fiss, Free Speech, supra note 5, at 1409 (noting that such a doctrine is an
accomplishment, though an obsolete criterion for free speech).
26. See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note 10, at 14; Clay Calvert & Robert D. Richards,
New Millennium, Same Old Speech: Technology Changes, But the First Amendment Is-
sues Don't, 79 B.U. L. REV. 959 (1999); Michael Vitiello, The Nuremberg Files: Testing
the Outer Limits of the First Amendment, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1175 (2000).
27. See Yochai Benkler, Siren Songs and Amish Children: Autonomy, Information,
and Law, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 23, 34 (2001) [hereinafter Benkler, Siren Songs] (noting "we
must focus on law's effects on the conditions that enable persons situated within a set of
worldly constraints"); Sunstein, supra note 10, at 1790. See also Benkler, Resilient, supra
note 7, at 220 (noting "speech... must be understood in context of... market and techno-
logical conditions").
28. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271 (1964); see also Yochai Benkler,
Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of the Public
Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354, 365 (1999) [hereinafter Benkler, Enclosure].
29. See, e.g., ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., FREEDOM OF SPEECH (1920); KATHLEEN M.
SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTIrUTIONAL LAW 986 (15th ed. 2004) [hereinafter
Sullivan].
30. See Benkler, Enclosure, supra note 28, at 364-77 & 377 n.104-05; Yochai
Benkler, From Consumers to Users: Shifing the Deeper Structures of Regulation Towards
2005]
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published a two-volume book, Government and Mass Communications,31
written with a group of public and private actors and scholars called the Com-
mission on Freedom of the Press. It did not limit its conclusions to the
broadcast medium. Indeed, Red Lion cites Chafee's book (discussing news-
papers, not broadcast) at key passages.32
Chafee had concerns beyond mere government distrust. In the preface,
the Commission asserted that freedom of the press "must mean more than the
traditional conception of immunity from government control."33 From the
Commission's perspective, "governmental action is only part of the main
problem . . . perhaps a small part," likely less than "ten percent" of the prob-
lem. 34
Chafee did not focus solely on government because he did not adopt un-
realistic assumptions about pamphleteers. Instead he focused on actual speech
in society. Chafee suggested that the new institutional structures, incentives,
economic requirements, and powers of the press should impact our concep-
tion of the law, because freedom of the press "was laid down when the press
was a means of individual expression, comment, and criticism." 35 The Com-
mission listed significant contemporary obstacles to press freedom other than
classical government censorship, such as advertisers' impact on the news
media and the decreased "number of persons who can acquire and operate a
successful newspaper ' 36 or other media outlets, 37 all of which matter in com-
munication tradition.
In rejecting a singular focus on government threats to an idealized image
of pamphleteers, Chafee emphasized a freedom not only "'from something,"
meaning government, but also 'for something, 38 such as effective speech or
viewpoint diversity for listeners. In assessing freedom 'for something,"
Chafee considered both speaker and listener interests. For example, he used
the term "communication," which he defined as "a two-way process of mu-
tual response between the members of the community, '39 rather than freedom
Sustainable Commons and User Access, 52 FED. CoMM. L.J. 561, 565-67 (2000) [herein-
after Benkler, Users]; Kathleen M. Sullivan, Free Speech and Unfree Markets, 42 UCLA
L. REV. 949, 954 (1995) (defending the asymmetry in speech and economic markets, list-
ing "new speech regulators" with whom she disagrees).
31. See ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., GOVERNMENT AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS
(1947).
32. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (citing 2 CHAFEE, supra note 31,
at 546) (announcing that the rights of viewers and listeners, not broadcasters, are para-
mount).
33. 1 CHAFEE, supra note 31, at vii.
34. Id. at ix.
35. Id. at 15, 19.
36. Id. at vii-viii.
37. Id. at xi-xii.
38. Id. at viii.
39. Id. at 21.
[Vol. 70
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of "expression," a term suggesting a focus on the expresser, not the mutual
exchange. In addition, Chafee did not limit his conclusions to any particular
medium. He did not refer to mass "media," but to "mass communication. 4 °
Because of the technology at the time, advancing listener interests and a
freedom "for something" implied "a friendlier view of the relationship be-
tween the government and mass communications" than had "[p]ast writers"
who-like many future writers-had seen "government as solely an enemy of
the press."41
Rejecting the false pamphleteering myth and anti-government stance,
Chafee supported government efforts to structure the communications order
on behalf of the public interest. For example, he supported the FCC's efforts
"to encourage better and more extensive communication" and "encourag[e]
discussion."
42
In addition, Chafee presumed that right-of-reply statutes, like those at is-
sue in Red Lion and Tornillo, were constitutional, even as applied to newspa-
pers.43 History, however, seems to have obscured this early presumption. For
example, some rely on 1974's Tornillo to suggest that right-of-reply has tradi-
tionally" been "unthinkable. ' 45 But Chafee, decades earlier, noted that Ne-
vada had established a statutory right-of-reply in newspapers in 1911.
41
Chafee even argued that some instances (for example, libel) may call more
for a right-of-reply than monetary damages. 47 He could imagine no constitu-
tional problem with requiring a right-of-reply that was not overly burdensome
in space or expense: the 1911 Nevada statute, he wrote, "seems free from
constitutional objections. '4 8
In 1967, more than 20 years after Chafee's book and more than 50 years
after the passage of the Nevada statute, Jerome Barron developed and added
to many of Chafee's arguments. Barron argued for "access to the press,
49
40. 1 thank David Barron for this point. See also CHARLES R. WRIGHT, MASS
COMMUNICATION: A SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 12 (1959) ("In popular usage the phrase
'mass communication' evokes images of television, radio, motion pictures, newspapers,
comic books, etc.").
4 1. 1 CHAFEE, supra note 31, at viii-ix.
42. Id. at 3-4.
43. Id. at 146-47.
44. See TRIBE, supra note 24, at 1002 (referring to a "tradition of unfettered" news-
paper editorial discretion).
45. See DANIEL A. FARBER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITIONAL
LAW: THEMES FOR THE CONsTrrUTION'S THIRD CENTuRY 632 (2d ed. 1998).
46. See I CHAFEE, supra note 31, at 171 & n.26.
47. See id. at 146-47 (regarding damages as merely historical baggage).
48. Id. at 172. He did, however, consider it constitutionally problematic to require a
newspaper to print a statement correcting a mistake when the newspaper believed it made
no mistake. Id.
49. See Jerome A. Barron, Access to the Press-A New First Amendment Right, 80
HARV. L. REV. 1641 (1967).
20051
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such as the access facilitated by right-of-reply laws. Barron also argued, and
felt the need to argue, that the "essentially romantic" pamphleteering and
soapbox images had become obsolete; he too argued that the First Amend-
ment must "respond[] to the present reality" of mass media.50 Barron also
argued against a narrow conception of government speech threats: the roman-
tic soapbox images inaccurately implied that, at the time, "without govern-
ment intervention, there is a free market mechanism for ideas." 51 Unfortu-
nately, this ignored the "reality and implications of nongovernmental obstruc-
tions to the spread of political truth. 5 2 Barron argued at length for analyses
based on reality and context that considered economic and technological fac-
tors.53 Although he argued that courts could find a constitutional right of ac-
cess for the public, he considered access legislation "more appropriate" and
constitutional.
5 4
Barron made the central distinction between "freedom of media content"
and "freedom of media [owners] to restrict access,, 55 a distinction between
content regulation and structural regulation that is now central to communica-
tion tradition discussions. Freedom of content serves free speech values,
while media owners' freedom from access might not always serve those val-
ues: "a right of expression is somewhat thin [for individuals] if it can be exer-
cised only at the sufferance of the managers of mass communications. 56 He
expressed particular concern that the First Amendment had become a means
for media owners to "repress[] competing ideas. 57
Like communication tradition scholars after him, Barron supported the
holding and spirit of United States v. Associated Press,5 8 which applied anti-
trust laws to the press, partly based on the First Amendment. Barron consid-
ered the case an important "acknowledgment that the public interest, here
embodied in the antitrust statutes, can override the first amendment claims of
the mass media."59 Barron noted that Judge Learned Hand's opinion in the
trial court "suggests first amendment protection for the interest which the
individual members of the body politic have in the communications process
itself.",60
50. Id. at 1641-43.
51. Id. at 1642.
52. Id. at 1643.
53. See id. at 1644-47, 1650-53. He notes, for example, "if the raison d'etre of the
mass media is not to maximize discussion but to maximize profits, inquiry should be di-
rected to the possible effect of such a fact on constitutional theory." Id. at 1660-61.
54. See id. at 1670.
55. Id. at 1651.
56. Id. at 1648.
57. Id. at 1642.
58. 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
59. Barron, supra note 49, at 1654.
60. Id. at 1654-55 (discussing United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362
(S.D.N.Y. 1943), aff'd, 326 U.S. 1 (1945)).
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Since Barron's work, scholars have built on and refined this tradition
over the last three decades. They include Owen Fiss,6' Jonathan Weinberg,62
C. Edwin Baker, 63 Cass Sunstein,64 Jack Balkin,6 5 Lawrence Lessig,6 6 and
Yochai Benkler.67 The tradition is not monolithic, and the scholars disagree
with one another on many points. But their work presents a central doctrine
that is at odds with paper tradition's "standard" free speech doctrine of leaf-
lets taught in law schools.
D. Paper Tradition: Five Established Tenets
The communication tradition conflicts with five central tenets of paper
tradition. As law students learn, paper tradition posits: 1) equating structural
regulation and content regulation; 2) a marked public/private distinction, with
an indifference to supposedly private speech power; 3) a nearly fatal pre-
sumption against content-based speech regulation; 4) a consistent preference
for clear rules over standards or balancing; and 5) little distinction between
entities' and individuals' speech.68
1. Equating Structural Regulation and Content Regulation
As Barron's work suggested, communication tradition distinguishes be-
tween the ideas of "content censorship" and "structural regulation." There is
61. See, e.g., Fiss, Free Speech, supra note 5.
62. See, e.g., Weinberg, supra note 9.
63. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 20.
64. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 10.
65. See, e.g., J.M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches
to the First Amendment, 1990 DUKE L.J. 375.
66. Lessig's arguments are often economic, but the speech components are evident.
See, e.g., LAWRENCE LEssIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A
CONNECTED WORLD (2001).
67. See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, Communications Infrastructure Regulation and the
Distribution of Control Over Content, 22 TELECOMM. POL'Y 183 (1998) [hereinafter
Benkler, Distribution of Control]. Benkler classifies contemporary constraints on freedom
of speech in three general categories: physical layer constraints ("wires, cables, fibers, and
radio frequency spectrum" manipulated by infrastructure owners), logical layer constraints
("software and standards" that burden users' speech), and content layer constraints (often
limited through overly protective exclusive rights in expression). Yochai Benkler, Prop-
erty, Commons, and the First Amendment: Towards a Core Common Infrastructure (Mar.
2001) (Brennan Ctr. for Justice at New York Univ. Sch. of Law, White Paper for the First
Amendment Program), available at http://www.benkler.org/WhitePaper.pdf [hereinafter
Benider, Core Common Infrastructure]. For an excellent discussion of contemporary
constraints at all layers see id. See also LESSIG, supra note 66, at 23.
68. For ease of discussion, I must leave aside many of the nuances of free speech
doctrine. See Bollinger & Stone, supra note 24, at I (noting that free speech doctrine is a
"highly intricate body of principles, doctrines, exceptions, and rationales").
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generally no such distinction in paper tradition. For communication tradition,
content censorship is where government targets and/or silences speech con-
tent that it disfavors. Structural regulations, by contrast, determine to some
extent who can speak to whom in society through structuring media indus-
tries. These include rules for telegraph, mail, telephone, broadcast, cable,
satellite, and the internet. They aim more at structure than content. They in-
clude, for example, certain access regulations, media concentration rules, and
communications-specific laws.
Paper tradition considers any communications-specific structuring to be
"government action" affecting speech, and almost per se invalid. It finds any
attempt to "burden" a speaker, like requiring a broadcaster or cable operator
to carry certain types of local or diverse speech, to be tantamount to content
censorship, and thus unconstitutional.
2. A Sharp Public/Private Distinction
Underlying paper tradition doctrine is a sharp public/private distinction
that strongly distrusts government intervention with private speech.69 Rhet-
orically, the distinction between public and private is clear with the image of
a soapbox or pamphleteer. A police officer or other state agent silences the
private speaker.
70
The tradition has a specific conception of "government action," and
such action is impermissible. 71 The doctrine considers the exclusive focus
72desirable because government is the biggest speech threat. It establishes a
speech "zone of noninterference ... around each individual" prohibiting "the
state (and the state alone)" from restricting speech.73 Government cannot be
trusted in any way to empower any private speech, even through structural
policies.7 a
69. Paper tradition advocates deem some government interventions acceptable, like
generally applicable laws touching on speech, but most are suspect. Sunstein, supra note
10, at 1760-61 & n.22.
70. See Fiss, Free Speech, supra note 5, at 1413 (noting "[cliassical liberalism," like
paper tradition, "presupposes a sharp dichotomy between state and citizen").
7 1. Weinberg, supra note 9, at 1182 (noting few "sharply bound" exceptions, such as
that police must protect an endangered speaker from a private mob). Cass Sunstein "enthu-
siastically agree[s] that the First Amendment is aimed only at governmental action."
SUNSTEIN, supra note 10, at 36-40. But he blurs the public/private distinction in such a
way that, in effect, the First Amendment covers almost everything. See id.
72. Fiss, Free Speech, supra note 5, at 1410 (noting it "assumes that by leaving indi-
viduals alone" free speech doctrine will foster "full and fair consideration of all the is-
sues").
. 73. Owen M. Fiss, Why the State?, 100 HARv. L. REv. 781, 785 (1987) [hereinafter
Fiss, Why the State].
74. See SuNsTEIN, supra note 10, at 5; Weinberg, supra note 9, at 1111.
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Paper tradition ignores any threat from "private" speech. For example, it
does not concern itself with discrepancies in private speech capacity, such as
lack of communicative property. 75 Indeed, it "protects" speech in the private
sphere largely by making property law central to its speech doctrine. Private
actors use property to speak-like pamphlets, bullhorns, flags, printing
presses, and cable systems. So government cannot "burden" property even for
76
ostensibly speech-promoting reasons.
Paper tradition also makes no distinction between forcing speakers, or
owners of media infrastructure, to carry government speech and to carry (for
a price or free) others' private speech." In this tradition, forcing a property
owner, like a cable operator, to carry others' speech is analogous to forcing
schoolchildren to repeat the pledge of allegiance. All carriage is a speech
"restriction," or "burden," even though one could view carriage as a burden
on one speaker-generally the owner of communication infrastructure-and
not on others, those without cable systems or broadcast stations. This is partly
why it believes Red Lion should be unconstitutional: it forces the broadcast
owner to "speak."
In keeping with this property-centric speech theory, the tradition inter-
prets even electronic media cases through the lens of property. When courts
determine that government can constitutionally "burden" a speaker in elec-
tronic media, paper tradition rationalizes the courts' decisions with property
justifications. Paper tradition proponents generally conclude that Red Lion's
decision, which they say burdens broadcasters, must result not from a free
speech principle but from the government "owning" the airwaves as property.
Similarly, "burdens" on cable operators must derive from property rights in
governmentally conferred rights-of-way to lay coaxial cable. The same schol-
ars, nonetheless, find their own property theories of electronic media cases
problematic, if not incoherent,78 and then argue, as a result, to discard the
electronic media cases as wrongly decided.
75. See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 24, at 808 n. 16. Law has noted real world disparities
in other areas of law, such as employment law. See, e.g., Weinberg, supra note 9, at 1146
& n.205.
76. See Benkler, Core Common Infrastructure, supra note 67, at 29 (noting that,
although Justice Black's absolutist position on the First Amendment, that "no law" means
"no law," has "been largely abandoned," "one sees occasional lapses... in particular in
the past decade where the property rights of media owners have been concerned").
77. See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 24, at 804-05.
78. See, e.g., id. at 1003; Bollinger, Jr., supra note 10 (referring to "the very weak-
ness" of arguments favoring broadcast regulation).
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3. A Nearly Fatal Presumption Against Content-based Speech Laws
In standard free speech doctrine, the divide between content-based and
content-neutral regulations is well-established,79 central, and often praised. 80
Content-based restrictions are virtually per se invalid while content-neutral
restrictions benefit from a balancing test.8' Paper tradition commends the
distinction because content-based restrictions "cut[] to the very heart of the
First Amendment," and let government determine what issues "may and may
not be questioned. 82
4. A Preference for Clear Rules over Balancing or Standards
Distrusting any government discretion, paper tradition holds that gov-
ernment must be bounded by fixed rules, not standards or balancing of inter-
83 84ests. The distrust of balancing is almost unique to speech doctrine. Al-
though several Justices have strongly endorsed balancing, even if in question-
able cases, 5 paper tradition advocates consider balancing to be "seductively
simple," better in theory than in practice, and argue that it could smuggle in
deference to other political branches and to majority rule.86 Paper tradition
even uses terms that reflect this preference for rules: holdings and Justices are
often called "speech-restrictive" or "speech-protective." This suggests there is
only one speech interest-and no others to balance. A decision balancing two
speech interests, however, may in theory be speech-protective no matter
which speech interest it decides to protect.
5. Entities and Individuals Are Interchangeable
Paper tradition doctrine generally does not distinguish between the
speech of entities and that of individuals.87 For example, corporate speech
generally benefits from rules and precedents based on individuals' speech.
Nor is corporate speech subject to balancing of interests, but to per se rules,
where content-based restrictions are involved. Treating entities and individu-
79. Fiss, Free Speech, supra note 5, at 1408-09 (noting the "rule against content
regulation ... now stands as the cornerstone of the Free Speech Tradition").
80. See, e.g., RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCIETY 43 (1992).
81. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 10, at 13; TRIBE, supra note 24, at 791.
82. Bollinger & Stone, supra note 24, at 20-21.
83. See, e.g., id. at 17; Weinberg, supra note 9.
84. SMOLLA, supra note 80, at 39-42.
85. See Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 747
(1996); SMOLLA, supra note 80, at 40.
86. SMOLLA, supra note 80, at 3942.
87. See Fiss, Free Speech, supra note 5, at 1422 (discussing the majority opinion in
First Natl. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978)).
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als identically derives from the strong public/private divide and the myth of
the soapbox speaker; the corporation is one speaker like any other.
E. Communication Tradition: Five Counter-Tenets
Communication tradition disagrees with these five venerable, estab-
lished tenets of paper tradition. Communication tradition disagrees largely
because it permits government some discretion with structural regulation
while paper tradition does not. As a result, communication tradition does not
disagree with paper tradition on pamphlet or flag-burning cases, even while it
would base its preferences on different animating concerns. Such cases are
properly decided based on the First Amendment's concern for promoting
antagonistic viewpoints and sources. But the tradition also agrees with most
of the electronic media cases based on the same concern, while the paper
tradition adamantly disagrees.
1. Structural Regulation Versus Content Censorship
Communication tradition maintains a distinction between structural
regulation and content regulation. It agrees with paper tradition that content
censorship is unconstitutional. It notes, however, that structural regulations
can differ from content regulations and have often been ruled constitutional.
It also supports some structural regulations based on normative concerns. It
argues that structural regulations are constitutional only when they tend to-
wards producing more distinct voices and outlets, such as promoting diver-
sity and localism, and do not target disfavored groups or opinions. 8 9 Concen-
trating speech power, and silencing disfavored groups or viewpoints through
structure, is essentially a method of encouraging private censorship. Well-
designed, viewpoint-neutral structural regulations that encourage a wide dis-
tribution of information from diverse and antagonistic sources are constitu-
tional.90
For communication tradition, courts play a central role in ensuring
government does not abuse structural regulation to censor. Society cannot
blindly trust government to properly structure speech because government
has a monopoly on the use of force, has the ability to impose regulations on
all private actors, 9' and often has a strong motive to suppress speech. Courts
should, and generally do, exercise "close judicial review"'92 where the
regulation affects the design and flow of information.9 3 Courts should analyze
88. See, e.g., Benkler, Core Common Infrastructure, supra note 67.
89. See Jerome A. Barron, Reading Turner Through a Tomillo Lens, 13 COMM.
LAW. 7, 8 (Summer 1995); Sunstein, supra note 10, at 1769-70.
90. Benkler, Core Common Infrastructure, supra note 67, at 30-31.
91. See, e.g., Benkler, Siren Songs, supra note 27, at 73; Fiss, Why the State, supra
note 73, at 787.
92. Benkler, Core Common Infrastructure, supra note 67, at 30.
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the design and flow of information. 93 Courts should analyze both a rule's
effect and intent because regulation intended to increase opportunities for
expression can be designed poorly because of "lack of sufficient care" (ef-
fect) or because of "successful lobbying" by a few against the many when
"burdens in general are diffuse and vague" (intent).94
The distinction between structural regulation and censorship is theoreti-
cally blurred at times,95 as is any distinction (like the distinctions for com-
mercial speech, political speech, and indecency). Like those distinctions,
however, the distinction is generally workable. It can be illustrated more con-
cretely with foundational electronic media cases. This requires presenting
communication tradition's seminal cases.
a. Communication Tradition's Foundational Cases
The communication tradition, naturally, derives from a set of founda-
tional Supreme Court cases, lower court cases, and regulations. Here I will
focus on a few Supreme Court cases for ease of discussion. These are Associ-
96
ated Press v. United States (newspapers), Red Lion (broadcast), FCC v.
National Citizens Commission for Broadcasting97 (newspapers and broad-
cast), and the two Turner cases (Turner I and //)98 (cable). All involve and
strongly support structural regulations-media-ownership regulations or re-
quired-access regulations meant to increase speech diversity and foster other
First Amendment values. Together, these cases reject the idea that "the First
Amendment is concerned solely with" a narrow conception of "government
power."99 They even suggest at points that government may be "constitution-
ally prohibited from diminishing the diversity of voices in our marketplace of
ideas" through encouraging or permitting domination of the speech market,
even by nongovernmental actors.' 00
The first case, Associated Press, in 1945, held that the First Amendment
did not absolutely shield newspapers from antitrust laws. Writing for the
Court, Justice Hugo Black held that the First Amendment reinforced the case
against the newspapers: "far from providing an argument against application
of [antitrust law], [the First Amendment] here provides powerful reasons to
93. Id.
94. Id. at 30, 39.
95. See, e.g., Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727
(1996).
96. 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
97. 436 U.S. 775 (1978)
98. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v.
FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997).
99. See Benkler, Core Common Infrastructure, supra note 67, at 27.
100. Benkler, Enclosure, supra note 28, at 365. See also Benkler, Resilient, supra note
7, at 219 ("Sometimes government intervention is the lesser evil when abstaining from
action would mean[] concentration of control over our information environment.").
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the contrary."' 0 ' The Court stressed that nongovernmental actors can under-
mine free speech values "if they impose restraints upon that constitutionally
guaranteed freedom." Similarly, "[f]reedom of the press from governmental
interference under the First Amendment does not sanction repression of that
freedom by private interests.' 1 2 In its most quoted line, the Court stated that
a central goal of the First Amendment is to ensure citizens attain "the widest
possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic
sources."'
103
Second, Red Lion, in 1969, upheld the fairness doctrine. It is perhaps
communication tradition's emblematic case, largely because of the Court's
rhetoric in upholding the doctrine. It emphasized that viewer and listener
interests were supreme and outranked mere property rights of powerful
speakers. It suggested the First Amendment does not protect specific speak-
ers, but protects speech in general; it does not just protect property interests,
but principally speech interests: "the people as a whole retain their interest in
free speech [not a form of property interest, as with paper tradition] by ra-
dio."' °4 The Court also suggested that government must not sanction speech
market concentration: "[i]t is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve
an uninhibited marketplace of ideas... rather than to countenance monopoli-
zation of that market, whether it be by the Government itself or a private li-
censee."' 05 The Court apparently did not rely merely on scarcity, but also the
government's role in structuring the media, and on the claims of access-
seekers:
In view of the scarcity of broadcast frequencies, the Government's
role in allocating those frequencies, and the legitimate claims of
those unable without governmental assistance to gain access to
those frequencies for expression of their views, we hold the regula-
tions ... at issue ... constitutional.
10 6
This suggests the Court considered all three factors-scarcity, the gov-
ernment's role in structuring the communication industry through allocation,
and the legitimate claims of other citizens, such as listeners and access-
seekers. 10 7 The Court explicitly held that the interests of viewers, not broad-
casters, were paramount.
10 8
101. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (emphasis added).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 400-01.
107. See Baker, supra note 20, at 100-03.
108. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390.
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Third, FCC v. National Citizens Commission for Broadcasting, in
1978,1° 9 echoes Associated Press but rests even more strongly on the First
Amendment. In that case, the Supreme Court upheld the FCC's prohibition
on an entity owning a newspaper and broadcast station in the same area.
Unlike Associated Press, these were not generally applicable antitrust laws
based on competition policy but, like Red Lion, specific regulations that the
FCC implemented based on speech considerations. According to the chal-
lengers, the regulations unconstitutionally "burdened" the speech rights of
broadcast and newspaper speakers.1 10 The Court soundly rejected this chal-
lenge. It made clear that "the Commission relied primarily on First Amend-
ment rather than antitrust considerations" to implement and defend the regu-
lations, and the Court upheld the regulations on that basis."' The Court spe-
cifically held that the regulations did not violate the First Amendment rights
of broadcast or newspaper owners.l12 The Court even suggested a preference
for regulation that structured the media environment towards diversity and
thereby reduced the need for constant government interference: "far from
seeking to limit the flow of information, the Commission has acted ... to
enhance the diversity of information heard by the public without on-going
government surveillance of the content of speech."' 1 3 In 2004, the Third Cir-
cuit relied heavily on NCCB to uphold FCC action against the challenges by
infrastructure-owners claiming limitations on their business activity violated
the First Amendment, even if these limitations enhanced speech diversity."l 4
Fourth, Turner I and II permitted Congress to require cable operators to
carry local broadcast channels. Despite their arguments in Red Lion, broad-
casters had a "predictable" "change of heart," and argued for access when the
question of access involved others' property. 1 5 Again, the Justices upheld
access. The Turner I majority deemed the must-carry legislation content-
neutral,' 16 targeting not content but cable's threat to free television and ca-
ble's peculiar power to control a communications "bottleneck."'"17 It re-
manded the case for further judicial factual development. " 8
In a forceful dissent, however, Justice O'Connor argued that the First
Amendment "rests on the premise that it is government power, rather than
private power, that is the main threat to free expression."'' 19 It is Justice
O'Connor's view of free speech-the overwhelming view, as we shall see,
109. 436 U.S. 775 (1978).
110. Id. at 789-99.
11. Id. at 800 n.18.
112. Id. at 798-802.
113. Id. 801-02 (citation and internal quotations omitted).
114. Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372 (3d Cir. 2004).
115. Barron, supra note 89, at 7.
116. Sunstein, supra note 10, at 1770, 1778.
117. Id. at 1765.
118. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 668 (1994).
119. Id. at 683-85 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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taught to free speech students-that the majority rejected. 12 Instead, the
Turner I Court held that "'assuring that the public has access to a multiplicity
of information sources is a governmental purpose of the highest order, for it
promotes values central to the First Amendment."",1
21
When the case returned to the Court after additional factual develop-
ment, in Turner II, Justice Breyer's fifth-vote concurrence, to uphold access,
relied on Associated Press and Red Lion for communication tradition's
proposition that the First Amendment should encourage "'the widest possible
dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources."",122 It
explicitly acknowledged speech interests on both sides of the case.'
23
The rules at issue in Red Lion and the Turner cases, for example, were
structural regulations. Both the fairness doctrine and the must-carry rules
structured who could speak; they did not target specific disfavored content.
The fairness doctrine was part of how government structured the use of the
airwaves. Due to early technological constraints, bandwidth had to be appor-
tioned; the government decided to allocate bandwidth primarily to concen-
trated, commercial uses despite the availability of many other options. The
fairness doctrine was part of this structure; it meant to ensure that viewers
would receive many viewpoints despite the few local outlets.
Similarly, the must-carry rules structured cable communications so that
cable operators did not have exclusive control over their subscribers' channel
offerings, and so that local free broadcast speech would remain available to
viewers. Although cable operators owned the communication infrastructure,
local broadcast stations could not be shut out of viewers' homes, and viewers
could continue to receive local broadcast without difficulty, when purchasing
cable.
Communication tradition interprets all these rulings broadly to justify
structural regulation, while paper tradition limits all of them and, as noted,
emphasizes a property-based justification for them all. To limit Red Lion,
paper tradition argues that Red Lion should be, or is, limited to broadcast
even though Red Lion consistently cited non-broadcast cases to justify its
opinion. For key holdings, Red Lion relied heavily on Associated Press and
cited New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,'24 a newspaper libel case, and Abrams
v. United States, a street comer case.125 Moreover, at places, it spoke of
120. Benkler, Enclosure, supra note 28, at 375.
121. Id. at 372-73 (quoting Turner, 512 U.S. at 663).
122. Turner Broad. Sys. Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 226-27 (1997) (Breyer, J., concur-
ring) (quoting Turner, 512 U.S. at 663) ("That policy [fostering the widest possible dis-
semination], in turn, seeks to facilitate the public discussion and informed deliberation,
which, as Justice Brandeis pointed out many years ago, democratic goverment presup-
poses and the First Amendment seeks to achieve.").
123. Id. (Breyer, J., concurring).
124. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
125. 250 U.S. 616 (1919). It cited the cases when it proclaimed, "[i]t is the purpose of
the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will
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broadcast as though it were not unique: "[t]he right of free speech of a broad-
caster, the user of a sound truck, or any other individual does not embrace a
right to snuff out the free speech of others."'' 26
Similarly, paper tradition limits Associated Press to its unique facts. The
case means merely that the First Amendment does not shield the press from
generally applicable laws, or perhaps merely from antitrust violations. 127 This
reading of Associated Press, however, differs from the Supreme Court's read-
ing of it in Red Lion and the Turner cases, both of which relied on Associated
Press for support but involved communications-specific regulation rather
than a generally applicable law. 128 Even Tornillo, which refused to follow
Associated Press, did not read it so narrowly. 129 Usually, however, paper
tradition just ignores Associated Press as apparently irrelevant for the First
Amendment. 
3 0
b. Structural Regulation Versus Content in Particular Cases
With this distinction in place, the two traditions do agree on certain
cases. Communication tradition would generally agree with paper tradition
that FCC v. Pacifica Foundation13 1 is wrongly decided because it permits
content censorship. In 1973, as part of an afternoon radio program about soci-
ultimately prevail, rather than to countenance monopolization of that market, whether it be
by the Government itself or a private licensee." Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S.
367, 390 (1969) (citing New York Times Co., 376 U.S. at 270; Associated Press v. United
States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945); Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630).
126. RedLion, 395 U.S. at 387.
127. See infra notes 483-85 and accompanying text.
128. Red Lion cited Associated Press at three points: I) 'Freedom of the press from
governmental interference under the First Amendment does not sanction repression of that
freedom by private interests."' Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 392 (quoting Associated Press, 326
U.S. at 20); 2) "It is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited mar-
ketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail, rather than to countenance mo-
nopolization of that market, whether it be by the Government itself or a private licensee."
Id. at 390; and 3) "The right of free speech of a broadcaster, the user of a sound truck, or
any other individual does not embrace a right to snuff out the free speech of others." Id. at
387.
Turner I cited Associated Press for this proposition: "The First Amendment's com-
mand that government not impede the freedom of speech does not disable the government
from taking steps to ensure that private interests not restrict, through physical control of a
critical pathway of communication, the free flow of information and ideas." Turner Broad.
Sys. Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622,657 (1994).
129. Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tomillo, 418 U.S. 241,254 (1974).
130. For example, Associated Press receives one brief reference in Laurence Tribe's
influential constitutional law treatise, where it quotes the words 'the widest possible dis-
semination of information."' See TRIBE, supra note 24, at 998 & n.2 (quoting Associated
Press, 326 U.S. at 20).
131. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
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ety's attitude towards language, a station played a comedian's monologue of
"seven dirty words" which are not permitted on radio.132 The FCC concluded
that the station had broadcast indecent speech and thus violated federal
law. 133 The Supreme Court upheld the FCC's determination, partly because
the Court claimed broadcast "received the most limited First Amendment
protection.' 34 For paper tradition, however, the broadcaster is a speaker, and
the government should not silence it. For communication tradition, the FCC's
ruling simply targeted disfavored speech by the broadcaster and Mr. Carlin.
Although one could argue that many speech interests are potentially involved,
such as listeners' interests in not hearing indecent speech, silencing all speak-
ers of certain content differs from attempts to foster a wide variety of speech.
That is, one can both support Red Lion and reject Pacifica.
The distinction also helps make sense of current speech threats. This is
evident in Denver Area Education Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v.
FCC, 35 where the Court seemed confounded by the cable rules at issue.
There, the federal government attempted to use structural regulation to censor
(and got away with it in part). The government permitted cable operators to
deny otherwise required carriage to indecent but protected speech on com-
mercial leased-access and public, educational, and governmental channels.'
36
The nine Justices produced six opinions urging four different results, uphold-
ing the regulation on leased-access channels. 3 7 For communication tradition,
Denver Area is a content (indecency) case masquerading as a structural case:
it is government's "self-conscious exclusion of certain content from [access]
coverage . . . to squelch unwanted speech.' 138 Communication tradition
would find Congress's intent and effect censorial and unconstitutional. This is
censorship laundered through private hands, which is a major communication
tradition concern.
Paper tradition would reach the opposite result. The rules would be con-
stitutional because of the private cable operator's involvement. Private par-
ties, like cable operators, cannot technically "censor." "Returning" editorial
discretion to deny coverage to the cable operator, therefore, is unproblematic.
132. Id. at 729-30.
133. Id. at 739.
134. Id at 748.
135. 518 U.S. 727 (1996).
136. Id. at 732-33. There was a third provision at issue, on which the two traditions
would agree. The Court invalidated a provision requiring leased channel operators to
segregate "patently offensive" programs to a single channel, block that channel, and re-
quire viewers to call in and unblock it after the viewer's written request. Id. at 733. Paper
tradition proponents would consider this infringing upon the operator's editorial discretion.
Communication tradition proponents would consider this to burden the speech rights of
viewers, as well as burden disfavored speech.
137. See Jonathan Weinberg, Cable TV, Indecency and the Court, 21 COLUM.-VLA
J.L &ARTS 95, 96 (1997).
138. Benkler, Siren Songs, supra note 27, at 79-80.
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In fact, the cable operator should be able to deny coverage whenever, wher-
ever, not just for indecent programs on these channels. The rules do not go far
enough. 139
2. Public and Private Blurred
In communication tradition, two distinct rationales complicate the paper
tradition's clear public/private divide. The first rationale focuses on media
industries, where the pubic and private blend. Government is already, and
necessarily, involved in electronic media speech, and much more than it is
involved in an individual's pamphlet speech. In any electronic media case, a
regulatory regime of generally applicable and communications-specific laws
is already in place.140 All free markets, even speech markets, "require a large
role for law."' 141 Generally applicable laws that affect electronic media in-
clude property, contracts, and torts, because media industries require complex
agreements and clear allocations of contractual and property rights. Commu-
nications-specific laws also shape the speech environment, including intellec-
tual property laws, especially copyright and trademark, as well as specific
telecommunication acts, cable acts, and satellite acts.' 4 2 Even paper tradition
proponents consider much of this government action beneficial. 143 Com-
pletely precluding government would be impossible. Moreover, it would re-
sult in a return to Lochner v. New York,' 44 a widely-discredited case that con-
stitutionally protected pre-existing property allocations. 1
45
139. See, e.g., Denver Area, 518 U.S. at 812 (Thomas, J., dissenting in part and con-
curring in part).
140. SUNSTEIN, supra note 10, at 37.
141. Id.
142. See LESSIG, supra note 66, at xvi.
143. For example, they approve of copyright, although the tradition's doctrine could
imply that copyright itself is unconstitutional. Rebecca Tushnet, Copyright as a Model for
Free Speech Law: What Copyright Has in Common with Anti-pornography Laws, Cam-
paign Finance Reform, and Telecommunications Regulation, 42 B.C. L. REv. 1, 2-3, see
also GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTrruriONAL LAW 1402 (4th ed. 2001) [hereinafter
STONE].
144. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
145. Often the tone of these government-pervasiveness arguments resemble legal
realists' nuanced attacks on legal reasoning behind infamous cases like Lochner, which did
not permit legislatures much constitutional range in choices regarding economic regula-
tion. The reasoning behind Lochner's fatal constitutional scrutiny for economic regulation,
according to legal realists of the 1920s and 1930s, rested largely on false notions of gov-
ernment neutrality, based on an overemphasis on the difference between "private" and
"public" law and action. See, e.g., Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a
Supposedly Non-coercive State, 38 POL. SCI. Q. 470 (1923).
For arguments that speech law is at places "Lochnerized," see SUNSTEIN, supra note
10, at 28-34, 98; Fiss, Free Speech, supra note 5, at 1422-23; Morton J. Horwitz, The
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The second rationale that questions the sharp public/private line focuses
on the individual speaker or listener. To the speaker or listener, it does not
matter if constraints are governmental or private. The constraints themselves
are what matter, and non-state actors can constrain an individual. 146 As
Zechariah Chafee wrote, "[i]t matters little who puts on the fetters.' ' 147 This
argument is as strong for a listener as for a speaker, as listeners should re-
ceive information permitting them a wide range of "meaningfully different"
options.
148
The prevalence of government action, however, can be considered cen-
tral also to the second rationale. Laws impact the degree private parties can
control the communications environments of other individuals or entities.
These include corporate law and speech doctrines. Part of the holding in Den-
ver Area Educational Telecommunication Consortium, Inc. v. FCC'4 9 helps
illustrate this effect. As noted, the Supreme Court considered rules permit-
ting, though not requiring, cable operators to deny otherwise required access
to protected speech. Justice Stevens's concurrence stated that the First
Amendment forbids government from creating "authorized private cen-
sors."'150 In fact, a plurality of the Court suggested that laws that unnecessarily
increased the censoring power of private speakers were invalid. 51 So law
could constrain speech by authorizing private parties to constrain it.
These two rationales, pervasive government action and a focus on the
communicating individual, suggest a permissible concern for private speech
power. The "private" speech burdens result not only from legal rules, but also
from the rules' interplay with technology and economics. Technological con-
cers include, for example, how law and software code shape computer users'
choices, or how legal choices of infrastructure and content provision deter-
mine the speaking and listening choices of Americans. 152 Economic concerns
derive from the conclusion that "left to itself," the speech market will not
conform to classical economic theory to satisfy consumer desires. These con-
cerns include, for example, asymmetric information, transaction costs, 53
Constitution of Change: Legal Fundamentality Without Fundamentalism, 107 HARV. L.
REv. 30, 109-16 (1993); Weinberg, supra note 9, at 1164.
146. Benkler, Siren Songs, supra note 27, at 51.
147. 2 CHAFEE, supra note 31, at 546.
148. Benkler, Siren Songs, supra note 27, at 53.
149. 518 U.S. 727 (1996).
150. Benkler, Siren Songs, supra note 27, at 28 n. 17 (quoting Denver Area, 518 U.S.
at 773 (Stevens, J., concurring)).
151. Benkler, Enclosure, supra note 28, at 365-66.
152. See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESsIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999);
Benkler, Distribution of Control, supra note 67.
153. Transaction costs include "information gathering and negotiation costs," which
affect the market decisions of rational actors. Benkler, Siren Songs, supra note 27, at 68.
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scarcity, 154 public good characteristics,' 55 externalities, 156 and the extensive
effects of advertising.157 As a result, government, which is already heavily
involved in communications through laws and regulation that may hinder
individuals' speech or sometimes concentrate speech power, can attempt to
foster diverse speech.
3. Content-based Restrictions Are Not Automatically Invalid
In communication tradition, structural regulations that improve mean-
ingful access to public debate may be necessarily content-based, and there-
fore should not automatically be considered unconstitutional. 58 First, con-
tent-based regulation is permitted in some areas of speech doctrine, even out-
side electronic media.' 59 Second, in electronic media, automatically fatal
scrutiny for content-based restrictions may thwart free speech purposes. Gov-
ernment must often use content-based criteria to promote speech diversity, as
effective regulation to promote diversity would require a focus on particular
speech "products." The "economic concepts of a product and product market
154. Although the street comer image "tends to... mask[]" scarcity, scarcity is the
rule, not the exception, in markets. Fiss, Free Speech, supra note 5, 1411-12. Speakers'
resources, time, and opportunities, and listeners' resources, time, and attention are all
scarce. Id. Because of this scarcity, communication tradition explores ways to make the
most of scarcity. See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, Overcoming Agoraphobia: Building the Com-
mons of the Digitally Networked Environment, 11 HARv. J. L. & TECH. 287 (1998).
155. Information can be seen as "a true public good in the strict economic sense. It is
not only nonexcludable, it is also nonrival." Yochai Benkler, An Unhurried View of Pri-
vate Ordering in Information Transactions, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2063, 2065 (2000).
156. Speech creates positive and negative externalities, which the speech provider
cannot or does not internalize. See, e.g., Benkler, Core Common Infrastructure, supra note
67, at 48.
157. See, e.g., C. EDWIN BAKER, ADVERTISING AND A DEMOCRATIC PRESS (1994)
[hereinafter BAKER, ADVERTISING]; C. EDWIN BAKER, MEDIA, MARKETS, AND
DEMOCRACY (2002) [hereinafter BAKER, MEDIA MARKETS]. Empirically, advertising leads
to less market competition. See C. Edwin Baker, Advertising and a Democratic Press, 140
U. PA. L. REV. 2097, 2123-32 (1992). Further, some interpret evidence to show that adver-
tising produces "direct and indirect controls" on content, such as self-censorship and con-
forming content to advertisers' desires. See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note 10, at 62-66;
Weinberg, supra note 9, at 1155-56; Jennifer Barrett, Where's the Dissent? Antiwar Pro-
tests Are Happening All Over the Country and the World, But the Mainstream Media Are
Hardly Paying Attention, Newsweek Web Exclusive, Jan. 16 2003, at 2003 WL
11863126.
158. See Fiss, Free Speech, supra note 5, at 1416.
159. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 425 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring)
(noting that the premise "that '[c]ontent-based regulations are presumptively invalid'-has
simplistic appeal, but lacks support in our First Amendment jurisprudence"). Speech doc-
trine is riddled with categorical content-based restrictions, such as commercial speech,
political speech, indecency, obscenity, and fighting words. See Bollinger & Stone, supra
note 24, at 9.
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are rooted in the concept of substitutability."' 6 0 CNN, the New York Times,
and MTV demonstrate that "[i]n media markets, the question of substitutabil-
ity turns inevitably on the content of speech."'' 61 To enhance product diver-
sity, economic regulation of speech markets "must employ categories based,
at least at some formalistic level, on ... content."'
162
Third, content-based decisions are not only required by economics, but
also have been historically ruled constitutional. 163 Edwin Baker provides am-
ple evidence that "content-discrimination analysis is ... not a faithful appli-
cation of prior media law precedent."' 164 For both electronic and print media,
"content-based governmental involvement with the communications order
has been a constant and ... courts have routinely upheld the governmental
involvement on the few occasions" of First Amendment challenges. 165 One
example of many is that Congress used the postal system to favor categories
of newspapers based on their content. Congress historically favored "intelli-
gent" content through second-class postage, created in 1879, available only to
newspapers disseminating "information of a public character, or devoted to
literature, the sciences, arts or some special industry."' 166 Certain content was
specifically excluded, thus facially burdened, including "regular publications
designed primarily for advertising purposes, or for free circulation, or for
circulation at nominal rates."'
67
Similarly, Sunstein argues that Turner I established a speech model, but
with an "important paradox at [its] heart.",168 Turner I requires both a pre-
sumptive invalidity of content-based restrictions and an endorsement of ef-
forts to increase diversity and promote local content. Diversity and localism,
however, are content-based preferences. These are preferences that govern-
ment has long promoted, constitutionally, generally through structural regula-
tion.
4. Rules and Balancing
Communication tradition stresses that competing speech interests must
often be balanced in electronic media speech. Private speech interests often
conflict in speech industries. As a result, balancing is often required and
should be acknowledged. With cable broadband internet, for example, one
may consider the speech rights of internet users, content providers, internet
160. Ashutosh Bhagwat, Of Markets and Media: The First Amendment, the New Mass
Media, and the Political Components of Culture, 74 N.C. L. REV. 141, 164 (1995).
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. See Baker, supra note 20.
164. Id. at 127-28.
165. Id. at 62.
166. Id. at 107 (quoting Post Office Act of March 3, 1879, 20 Stat 355).
167. Id. at 108 (quoting 20 Stat 355).
168. See Sunstein, supra note 10, at 1778.
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service providers, and infrastructure-owners. If one ignores the speech inter-
ests of everyone but infrastructure-owners, the owners' interests would be
deemed on balance constitutionally paramount. 69 The benefit of this sort of
balancing is that it is not case-by-case but can be used as a general rule, limit-
ing judicial discretion to one case. The problem with this rule is that it may
effectively silence more people than would case-by-case analysis. Thus, the
dangers of balancing may or may not be less than those realized by applying
rules. 70
In addition, balancing may be more transparent. It may more accurately
reflect judges' rationales for their decisions. Judges have wide discretion be-
cause they have many conflicting rules to choose from, all of which seem to
compel them to a result.' 71 Judicial transparency in speech regulation would
conform with free speech goals better than judicial opacity.
Communication tradition advocates argue that balancing has historically
played an important role in communication regulation. For example, govern-
ment balanced the interests of different newspapers when it established postal
subsidies, causing burdens for some and not for others. Red Lion deemed
listeners' speech interests more significant, on balance, than those of the
broadcasters.172 Breyer's concurrence in Turner H explicitly endorsed balanc-
ing.' 73
5. Entities and Individuals Get Different Treatment
Some communication tradition scholars argue that the constitutional
speech rights of individuals should differ from those of legally created enti-
ties. Edwin Baker, the major advocate for this position, argues first that courts
should treat precedents involving individuals as different from those involv-
ing corporations. 74 This could permit greater individual speech rights, while
corporate speech, or structural media, cases would not weaken individual
freedom. For example, advertisers should not inherit "soapbox protections,"
nor should broadcasters, cablecasters, and newspapers inherit "schoolchildren
169. Cf Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 816
(1996) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("the operator's right... is
preeminent").
170. Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV.
L. REV. 1685, 1685, 1687-89 (1976).
171. See David Kairys, Freedom of Speech, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE
CRITIQUE 200 (David Kairys ed. 3d ed. 1998). For example, in the cable case Denver Area,
the Justices could have analogized cable speech to bookstores, broadcast, or common
carriers, and their chosen sharp ("predictable") legal rules to apply accordingly. See Den-
ver Area, 518 U.S. at 741-42.
172. See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 389-90 (1969).
173. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 227 (1997) (Breyer, J., concur-
ring).
174. See Baker, note 20, at 62-80.
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forced speech protections." Second, while content-based restrictions should
be "presumptively objectionable" when applied to individuals, such restric-
tions should not carry as strong a presumption when applied to legally created
entities. 175 Yochai Benkler argues that free speech claims of entities must at
least be checked by instrumental considerations of whether a rule will en-
hance an individual's expressive freedom.' 
76
Although disparate individual/entity treatment can be rooted in a theory
of the First Amendment like the marketplace of ideas or self-governance,
177
Baker and Benkler emphasize the autonomy rationale. 178 Many have argued
corporations lack real autonomy: 179 "[i]t is meaningless to speak of a collec-
tion of contracts and hierarchical organizational relations as being 'the sub-
ject' of autonomy."' 80 Despite extremely wide philosophical divergences in
the use of the term "autonomy," "[a]bout the only features held constant...
are that autonomy is a feature of persons and that it is a desirable quality to
have."
18 1
Even if entities could have autonomy, law should be more able to affect
this "autonomy" through structural regulation because law already creates
and structures these entities. 8 2 "[L]aw has little role in structuring individu-
als" other than perhaps shaping some self-conceptions. 8 3 Yet government
regulations, like corporate and contract law, inevitably shape authority rela-
tionships in entities.'8 4 Law allocates rights and establishes baselines where
there is no "natural" default."' Partly as a result of such structuring, law de-
cides which persons within the organization who can speak for the organiza-
tion and which can silence others wishing to speak through the organization
or its property. Although "[i]n the United States most commentators without
175. See id. at 62.
176. Benkler, Core Common Infrastructure, supra note 67, at 8.
177. See Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
178. See, e.g., C. EDWIN BAKER, HuMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 47-51
(1989); Benkler, Siren Songs, supra note 27.
179. See, e.g., MATrHEW D. BUNKER, CRITIQUING FREE SPEECH: FIRST AMENDMENT
THEORY AND THE CHALLENGE OF INTERDISCIPLINARITY 12 (2001) (summarizing some
notions of autonomy in free speech, generally based on "human beings" developing their
"humanity" or "self-realization").
180. See Benkler, Siren Songs, supra note 27, at 58. See also Benkler, Core Common
Infrastructure, supra note 67, at 8 ("real human beings, not corporate entities, are the bear-
ers of the moral claims of autonomy to freedom of expression"); Timothy J. Brennan, The
Spectrum as Commons: Tomorrow's Vision, Not Today's Prescription, 41 J.L. & ECON.
791, 796-97 (1998) (arguing corporations lack "rights" to communicate).
181. GERALD DWORKIN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY 6 (1988) (em-
phasis added), cited in Benkler, Siren Songs, supra note 27, at 32 n.29.
182. With individuals, however, personal choice is "fundamental [and] deeply
rooted." Baker, supra note 20, at 67.
183. Id. at 62.
184. Id. at 67.
185. Id. at 67-69.
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reflection identify the press with owners [not] ... editors and journalists, 18 6
it is speech law that determines what we mean by the "speaker" of, for in-
stance, a cable operator's "protected speech.' 8 7 The "speaker" could be the
corporate "owner(s) (often thousands of stockholders)," the board of direc-
tors, the senior management, particular journalists or producers, or perhaps,
metaphysically, the "entity itself."' 8 8 Therefore, when courts defend corporate
speech, they defend the speech of individuals on whom government itself has
conferred speech power to silence others--others within and without the or-
ganization.
Similarly, in addition to pervasive government structuring of entities,
Baker argues that corporate speech is a blend of subsidy and restriction."'
Media companies can deduct their speech as a business expense, and any
company can deduct advertising, which is protected speech.' 90 These deduc-
tions are government speech subsidies that typical individual speakers are
rarely entitled to take. Other government benefits include mundane laws like
perpetual corporate life and limited liability. Therefore, government can per-
haps condition its many speech subsidies to corporations in ways it cannot
with individuals.
II. EMPIRiCs: DISCOURSE IN AMERICA
Electronic media have not only inspired a speech doctrine that apparently
conflicts with other doctrine, but they also play a central role in American com-
munication. Unlike for electronic media, there are no data quantifying how much
political or nonpolitical information or communication occurred in the last two
centuries through pamphlets, handbills, leaflets, street comer speech, picketing,
posters, burning flags, hate speech in any medium, etc. Since communications
technology has expanded individuals' perceived political and cultural communi-
ties, however, it is unlikely that soapboxes and leaflets can satisfy individuals'
demand to communicate within their relevant communities.' Most studies, per-
haps assuming the marginal impact of leaflets, pickets, and handbills, usually
provide information only on newspapers, cable, and the internet.
A serious study of leaflet communication took place in 1951-1954, half a
century ago.192 When an author discussed the study a few years later, he noted the
marginal effect of leaflets even then: "When we talk about the mass media we do
not ordinarily think of leaflets.... [U]sually leaflets fall on the periphery of our
186. Id. at 112n.177.
187. Id. at 62-63.
188. Id. at63.
189. Seeid. at 69.
190. Id. at 63. See also Bernard Wolfman, In Memoriam: Stanley S. Surrey: States-
man, Scholar, Mentor, 98 HARV. L. REv. 343, 344 (1984) (discussing the tax expenditure).
191. Benkler, Core Common Infrastructure, supra note 67, at 2.
192. WRIGHT, supra note 40, at 68-72.
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attention."' 3 The U.S. Air Force commissioned the study, which attempted to
determine what would happen if an enemy power eliminated the electronic com-
munications media.194 This suggests, obviously, that electronic media would
provide primary communication, while leaflets would help only in an emergency.
The study included air drops of leaflets over eight communities over three years,
local mass media's agreement not to cover the story or interrupt the experiment,
and pamphlets that encouraged the recipient to spread word of the experiment. 5
For many reasons, including a pamphleteer's usual lack of an air force, this study
did not reveal much about the actual day-to-day impact of leafleteers, then or
now.
Newspapers, another medium within paper tradition's First Amendment
"core," are used much less frequently than electronic media. Since the early
1960s, newspapers have not been America's number one news source; broadcast
has been.19 6 Since the 1940s, newspaper circulation per capita has been declin-
ing.197 Nor do Americans consider newspapers superior to other sources. In fact,
the opposite is true: "Americans give newspapers lower marks for believability
and credibility than they do for local television news, or any of the three network
newscasts and CNN.... The only news medium that newspapers seemed to sur-
pass when it comes to believability is print magazines."'
198
By contrast, electronic media are America's dominant communication
methods, and have been for over half a century. Their impact is not previously
unnoticed. As early as 1933, Franklin Delano Roosevelt's "Fireside Chats" dem-
onstrated the importance of broadcast radio. Television, specifically the first tele-
vised presidential debate series, is generally credited with John F. Kennedy's
1960 election. Seventy million Americans watched the debates, and more than
half of voters reported that the debates influenced their votes.' 99
In addition, many First Amendment scholars, even those who seem to focus
on non-electronic speech, have long noted electronic speech's importance. Over
fifteen years ago, Laurence Tribe, who devotes little space to electronic speech in
his influential constitutional treatise, noted that "[t]he printing press ha[d] been
193. Id. at 68.
194. Id. at 69.
195. Id. at 69-70.
196. Project for Excellence in Journalism, The State of the News Media 2004, avail-
able at http://www.stateofthenewsmedia.com/2004 (under "Newspaper" and "Audience");
PEW RESEARCH CTR. FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS, CABLE AND INTERNET LOOM LARGE
IN FRAGMENTED POLITICAL NEWS UNIVERSE (2004), available at http://www.pewintemet.
org/reports/pdfs/PIPPoliticalInfoJanO4.pdf.
197. Project for Excellence in Journalism, supra note 196.
198. Project for Excellence in Journalism, supra note 196, available at http://www.s
tateofthenewsmedia.org/narrativenewspaperspublicattitudes.asp?cat=7&media=2 (un-
der "Newspapers" and "Public Attitudes").
199. See Erika Tyner Allen, The Kennedy-Nixon Presidential Debates, 1960, avail-
able at http://www.museum.tv/archives/etv/K/htnlK/kennedy-nixon/kennedy-nixon.htm
(last visited Mar. 20,2005).
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replaced by" television.200 The influence of newspapers, he claimed, was
"dwarfed" by radio stations and "the gargantuan television networks with their
myriad affiliates. '20 ' Tribe noted that the average family watched "TV for more
than a third of its waking hours" and that "television ha[d] become the primary
source of news for a majority of the population." 20 2 Earlier, the speech scholar
Harry Kalven noted before his death in 1974 how speech was skewed by "the
sheer weight of broadcasting, the sheer weight of advertising, and the ownership
of the means of communication."
20 3
Today's data on broadcast and cable television indicate that television con-
tinues to be an enormous part of Americans' daily communication. The vast ma-
jority of Americans have televisions-in 2000, approximately 97 percent of all
204households. The majority receive their content through cable or satellite. Al-
most 65 percent of these households have cable delivery 205 and approximately 15
percent have direct satellite delivery.20 6 Only one in five households, then, re-
ceive televised content through broadcast.
Cable not only delivers most television content, it also provides much of it
207to the 80 percent of television households that receive cable content. Cable
provides Americans as much watched content as broadcast provides: in 2002,
"ad-supported cable ... [narrowly] surpassed the seven national broadcast net-
works combined in primetime viewership for a complete season. 20 8
Not only do Americans own televisions, but as one would expect, they
watch them often. According to Nielsen Media Research, every day, on average,
adult men watch more than four hours of television, adult women more than five,
200. TRME, supra note 24, at 1007.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. KALVEN, supra note 22, at xiv.
204. Compare Press Release, Nielsen Media Research, Nielsen Media Research Esti-
mates 102.2 Million TV Households in USA (Aug. 24, 2000), available at
http://www.nielsenmedia.com/newsreleases/2000/2000-OIUE.htm (102.2 million house-
holds with television) with Census Bureau, U.S. Summary 2000, available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/c2kprofOO-us.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 2004)
(105,480,101 total households).
205. Compare Press Release, FCC, FCC Releases Ninth Annual Report on Competi-
tion in Video Markets 1 (Dec. 31,2002), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-publi
c/attachmatch/DOC-229984Al.pdf (last visited Jan. 7, 2005) (unofficial FCC announce-
ment) with Census Bureau, supra note 204, at 2.
206. See Press Release, FCC, supra note 205.
207. See Cabletelevision Advertising Bureau, Penetration of Cable Programming
Climbs to an All-Time High in April, at http://www.cabletvadbureau.com/01news/01 041
1 news.htm.
208. See Press Release, Cabletelevision Advertising Bureau, A TV First: Ad-
Supported Cable Wins Primetime Viewership Race for Entire 2001/2002 Season (Sept.
24, 2002), available at http://www.cabletvadbureau.com/02PressReleases/020924.htm.
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and those between the ages of 2 and 17 watch more than three.209 In all, the aver-
age American household watches more than eight hours a day.21 The average
American child spends more time watching television than she spends attending
school. 21 Television is America's informal and continuing educational re-
212
source.
Americans receive more of their news information from television than any
other medium, although the internet may soon change tls.2 3S It "'continues to be
far and away Americans' primary and most credible source for news and infor-
mation.', 214 One 2003 survey indicated that television remains the most trusted
news source: respondents said that when they "hear conflicting versions of the
same news story" they "most trust" network television news (30.8 percent) and
local television news (24.3 percent) ahead of newspapers (21.3 percent).2 15 Politi-
cians know to focus on television. For the 2004 presidential election, candidates
raised hundreds of millions of dollars, largely to pay for television advertising.
Considering cable specifically, all-news channels are major sources of news
and information. In 2002, 72 million viewers a month watched CNN and 54 mil-
lion watched Fox News. 216 During prime time hours, Fox News averaged 1.2
million viewers nightly; CNN averaged 900,000; and MSNBC averaged
217360,000. Thus, even the least watched of these stations probably reached a
thousand times more people nightly than could the most proficient and untiring
pamphleteer or flag burner.
The internet, like broadcast and cable, is a frequently used and important
medium and news source. In 2001, over 165 million Americans were estimated
209. Shankar Vedantam, Study Ties Television Viewing to Aggression: Adults Affected




211. See NEWTON N. MINOw & CRAIG L. LAMAY, ABANDONED IN THE WASTELAND:
CHILDREN, TELEVISION, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 18 (1995).
212. See Owen M. Fiss, The Censorship of Television, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 1215, 1216
(1999).
213. See Dawn Kawamoto, Net Ranks as Top Information Source, CNet News.com,
(Jan. 31, 2003), at http://news.com.com/2100-1040-982995.html?tag-cd_mh.
214. Charles W. Logan, Jr., Getting Beyond Scarcity: A New Paradigm for Assessing
the Constitutionality of Broadcast Regulation, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1687, 1720 n.192 (1997)
(citing ROPER STARCH WORLDWIDE, AMERICA'S WATCHING: PUBLIC ATrrUDES TOWARD
TELEVISION (1995)); Pew Research Ctr. for the People & the Press, Survey Report: Presi-
dent's Criticism of Media Resonates, But Iraq Unease Grows, (Oct. 21, 2003), available at
http://people-press.org/reports/print.php3?PagelD=748 (Questionnaire, Question 8).
215. See Radio-Television News Dirs. Found., 2003 Local Television News Study of
News Directors and the American Public 17, available at www.rtnda.org/ethics/2003surve
y.pdf (2003 data).
216. See Brian Lowry, For Cable Networks, 2002 Was a Solid Year, L.A. TIMES, Jan.
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as World Wide Web users.218 One study indicates that in 2002, more than 70
219percent of all Americans went online. Meanwhile, a survey of two thousand
households notes that 47 percent of non-interet users in 2002 reported to be
cc 220
"somewhat" or "very likely" to go online within the next year.
Time spent online continues to increase, exceeding time spent reading
newspapers or pamphlets.22 1 Online time will likelyincrease because broadband
use is increasing while modem use is decreasing, and broadband users spend
more time online than modem users.222 Also, an individual's online use increases
based on the number of years she has been online.2 3
The intemet has a profound impact on personal communication and speech.
For example, one study notes that more than half of intemet users report an in-
crease in the number of people with whom they stay in contact since beginning
224their internet use. Much of this communication includes political activity. For
example, in 2002, about 27 percent of users (or 19 percent of Americans), used e-
225
mail to communicate with a government official. That same year, 46 percent of
users agreed or strongly agreed that "by using the Intemet people like you can
better understand politics, '226 and half that number believed the intemet increased
their actual political power.227
In terms of news delivery, as early as 1999, a statistical survey by MSNBC
indicated that online news was "in a statistical dead heat with cable television and
radio and is used slightly more often than magazines. 228 A 2002 survey showed
60.5 percent of intemet users considered the interet a "very important or ex-
tremely important source of information. 229 This will also likely increase with
broadband deployment, as broadband users consider the internet a more impor-
tant information source than do modem users.230 This usage may increase as
users become more experienced: users who have been online for at least six years
218. See Victoria D. Bush & Faye W. Gilbert, The Web as a Medium: An Exploratory
Comparison of Internet Users Versus Newspaper Readers, J. MKTG. THEORY & PRAC.,
Winter 2002, at 1, 1,2002 WL 25332625, at *1.
219. See HARLAN LEBO, THE UCLA INTERNET REPORT: SURVEYING THE DIGITAL
FUTURE, YEAR THREE 17 (Feb. 2003), available at http://ccp.ucla.edu/pdf/UCLA-Intemet-
Report-Year-Three.pdf.
220. Id. at 30.
221. Id. at 17.
222. See id. at 25.
223. Id. at 22.
224. Id. at 55.
225. See id. at 58.
226. Id. at 69.
227. See id at 69-70.
228. Adam Clayton Powell III, MSNBC: Online News Audience Now Equals Radio
News Listeners (Jan. 26, 1999), at http://www.freedomforum.org/templates/document.asp?
documentlD=l 1362.
229. LEBO, supra note 219, at 35.
230. See id. at 37.
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rank the intemet "higher than books, television, radio, newspapers, and maga-
zines as an important source of information.",23' Reading news is the third most
popular internet activity, engaged in by 51.9 percent of users in 2002.232
Finally, other electronic devices are important to Americans' lives and al-
ready have the capacity to be important conduits of speech. Video game ma-
chines could become important communications devices. For instance, some
gaming machines (e.g., Microsoft's Xbox) provide online access and can possi-
bly be used as personal computers.233 Because 92 percent of Americans aged 2-
17 play video games or computer games, communications through video game
consoles could become significant.2 34 In addition, DVD and VCR players and
digital programming recorders like TIVO (used in at least 1.5 million house-
holds)235 and its more open competitors 236 are already significant for speech: 90
percent of American households use VCRs and roughly 30 percent own a DVD
237player. In fact, Americans grow up on electronic media: "The average Ameri-
can child grows up in a home with two TVs, .. . three radios, two VCRs, two CD
players, one video game player and one computer."
238
Clearly, electronic media powerfully impact American society. Conse-
quently, the law of electronic media, not pamphlets, structures most of American
speech. "Free speech" law is, or should be considered, the law that shapes speech
through electronic media.
231. See id. at 35.
232. Id. at 18.
233. See Seth Schiesel, Some Xbax Enthusiasts Microsoft Didn't Aim For, N.Y.
TIMES, July 10, 2003, at G1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/07/10/technology/
circuits/1Oxbox.html; Xbox-Linux Project, at http://www.xbox-linux.org (last modified
Jan. 3, 2005).
234. See Nat'l Inst. on Media and the Family, Sixth Annual Video and Computer
Game Report Card 2 (Dec. 13, 2001), at http://www.mediafamily.org/research/reportvgrc
_2001.pdf, cited in Media Family, Fact Sheet, Media Use, available at
http://www.mediafamily.org/facts/factsmediause.shtm (last visited Nov. 12, 2004).
235. See Michael Learmonth, The AtTaCk OF TiVo, FOLIO, Feb 1,2003.
236. See Leander Kahney, Tired of the Telly? Reprogram It, WIRED NEWS, (July 22,
2003), at http'//www.wired.corn/news/technology/0, 1282,59690,00.html.
237. See Media Family, supra note 234 (noting "30 million households own a DVD
player") (citing Rick Lyman, Revolt in the Den: DVD Has VCR Headed for the Attic, N.Y.
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III. ANALYSIS OF CASEBOOKS AND TREATISES
A. Casebooks
The first [major technique of "renormalizing" doctrine] is simple
enough: Ignore the case. Treat it as a unique event in the legal uni-
verse, unlikely ever to be repeated.239
In this Part, I evaluate a sample of constitutional law and First Amend-
ment casebooks used in the "top ten" law schools 24° to learn how much space
is devoted to electronic media and to learn which narrative, paper tradition or
communication tradition, predominates. 241 I also evaluate the two standard
constitutional law treatises, by Tribe and by Rotunda.
My sample of constitutional textbooks includes five,242 each of which I
refer to by the name of the first listed author: Sullivan,243 Stone, 2 " Choper,245
246 247Rotunda,246 and Chemerinsky. The initial sample of First Amendment text-
books includes four: Stone,241 Volokh,249 Shiffrin,250 and Van Alstyne.25' For
two reasons, I analyze the constitutional and First Amendment texts together.
First, the constitutional texts devote fairly long sections to freedom of speech;
239. Mark Tushnet, Renormalizing Bush v. Gore: An Anticipatory Intellectual His-
tory, 90 GEO. L. J. 113, 114 (2001).
240. I based this list of schools on U.S. News and World Report's 2004 list of top law
schools: Yale, Harvard, Stanford, Columbia, New York University, Chicago, University of
Michigan-Ann Arbor, University of Pennsylvania, University of Virginia, and Duke. I
excluded Northwestern, tied at 10. The top ten schools of 2004 are the same as the top ten
schools of 2005. The 2005 list is available at http://www.usnews.com/usnews/edu/gradlran
kings/law/brief/lawrankbrief.php (last visited Mar. 20,2005).
241. Publishers would not provide any sales information, so to determine the books
used at these ten schools, I contacted their primary bookstores for lists of the ordered con-
stitutional law textbooks and First Amendment casebooks for the school year for 2003-04.
242. A sixth book, PAUL BREST ET AL., PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL
DECISIONMAKING: CASES AND MATERIALS (4th ed. 2000 & Supp. 2004) [hereinafter
BREST], does not have an individual section on freedom of speech, and devotes so little
space to speech issues that I do not include it in the sample.
243. SULLIVAN, supra note 29.
244. STONE, supra note 143.
245. CHOPER, supra note 1.
246. RONALD D. ROTUNDA, MODERN CONSTrrtONAL LAW: CASES AND NOTES (7th ed.
2003).
247. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2001).
248. GEOFFREY STONE ET AL., THE FIRST AMENDMENT (2d ed. 2003)
249. EUGENE VOLOKH, THE FIRST AMENDMENT: PROBLEMS, CASES AND POLICY
ARGUMENTS (2001).
250. STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN & JESSE H. CHOPER, FIRST AMENDMENT (3d ed. 2001).
251. WILLIAM W. VAN ALSTYNE, TE AMERICAN FIRST AMENDMENT IN THE TWENTY-
FIRST CENTURY (3d ed. 2002).
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and these sections are comparable in length to the First Amendment texts.252
Second most of the First Amendment texts in the sample are simply stand-
alone publications of the First Amendment sections of constitutional texts in
253the sample. To that extent, I analyze the constitutional law texts, for consis-
tency, when the two books overlap. Third, scholars rely on the constitutional
casebooks, of course, for their First Amendment sections.25 4
The method of choosing the sample has some drawbacks. For example,
schools outside of U.S. News's top ten may not use these same texts.'5' The
focus on "top schools," however, is deliberate because of their disproportion-
ate influence in producing and molding future scholars: "Harvard, Yale, and
Chicago train over 70% of the authors of the most highly cited legal arti-
cles. 256 The textbooks of my sample provide the range of topics to which
these law students are exposed and from which law professors choose to ex-
pose these students.2 57
I first note the amount of space each text allocates collectively to broad-
cast, cable, the internet, and telephone versus other methods of communica-
tion. Then I discuss the texts' structure and organization, as well as salient
details of each text's treatment of electronic media.
252. As I analyze only the sections of the constitutional law casebooks devoted to
freedom of speech, I exclude Brest. Brest does not cover free speech in its own section.
See BREST, supra note 242. Although analysis is possible, comparison seemed less useful.
For a discussion of traditional casebooks, which Brest is not, see Richard B. Collins, Cases
Versus Theory, 21 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 853 (1998) (reviewing WILLIAM COHEN &
JONATHAN D. VARAT, CONSTIrUTIoNAL LAw (10th ed. 1997)).
253. The Stone, Sullivan, and Shiffin First Amendment texts reprint, sometimes with
minor changes, the sections in the Stone, Sullivan, and Choper constitutional texts, respec-
tively.
254. For example, Sullivan's casebook is among the most cited law books. See Fred
R. Shapiro, The Most-cited Legal Books Published Since 1978, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 397,
405 tbl. 2 (2000) (referring to earlier editions, and listing only the Tribe treatise, supra note
24, at number one, and another treatise, JOHN E. NOwAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA,
CONSTrrTrONAL LAW (1991) (1995), at number seven, as more cited constitutional trea-
tises or textbooks).
255. In 1998, there were only twelve constitutional law casebooks on the market.
David E. Engdahl, Casebooks and Constitutional Competency, 21 SEATIrLE U. L. REV.
741,744 (1998). Many other casebooks have been published since then.
256. Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-cited Law Review Articles Revisited, 71 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 751, 762-65 (1996).
257. Moreover, I performed this analysis twice, once when I originally wrote the arti-
cle, and once updated a year later in preparation for publication. The first draft, which
included University of California in the top ten, and had some other differences, included
five other distinct texts. The quantitative and qualitative analysis of those books was in
keeping with the analysis of these books.
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1. Overview
The following two tables compare the number of pages devoted to cases
or discussion centering on electronic media.25 8 The column entitled "Elec-
tronic Media Ratio" compares the ratio of pages centering on electronic me-
dia to the total number of speech pages. I consistently err on the side of over-
stating the media emphasis, to ensure I do not understate electronic media
259pages.
258. I counted the number of pages in the published textbook (not including the yearly
supplement) devoted to freedom of speech and press. I compared that number to the total
number of pages devoted to issues of electronic media. In the total, I included every page
from the first page of a chapter dealing with freedom of speech to the last page with text
devoted to the subject and excluded pages devoted to other First Amendment rights such
as association or religious liberties-partly because such pages tended not to include any
electronic media.
259. For example, I include any page that has at least one paragraph of text, though
not merely text in footnotes, devoted to a case or discussion on these media. I also include
Tornillo in the count of electronic media pages. Although it is a newspaper case that does
not cite Red Lion, it generally accompanies Red Lion or begins a section (as the supposed
"rule") to demonstrate that Red Lion and the Turner cases which follow, are "exceptions."
See, e.g., RoTuNDA, supra note 246, at 1092; STONE, supra note 143, at 1389-91.
[Vol. 70
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Textbook Media Ratio Percentage





Van Alstyne26  49/820 5.98%
Volokh 65/588 11.05%
260. The total SULLVAN, supra note 29, speech pages include 984-1502, excluding
1386-1424 (Freedom of Association). The electronic media speech pages include 1138-58
(communications indecency, including Pacifica, Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 492
U.S. 115 (1989), United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803 (2000), Reno
v. ACLU, Ashcroft v. ACLU, 124 S. Ct. 2783 (2004)); 1285-88 (Ark. Educ. Television
Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666 (1998); United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, Inc., 539
US 194 (2003)); 1321-22 (FCC v. League of Women Voters of California, 468 U.S. 364
(1984)); 1332-33 (Am. Library Ass 'n, Inc. again); 1340-41 (Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coali-
tion, 535 U.S. 234 (2001)); 1344-45 (Illinois v. Telemarketing Assoc., Inc., 538 US 600
(2003)); 1378-83 (compelled right-of-replies, including Tornillo, Turner I and II, a brief
reference to Red Lion, and other cases); 1486-88 (Turner 1); 1490-1502 ("Differential
Regulation" of media).
261. The total STONE, supra note 143, speech pages include 993-1409 (excluding
1354-59, a case and accompanying "Note: association and the First Amendment"). The
electronic media speech pages include 1192-1204 (media cases in indecency section),
1286-88 (Ark Educ. in public forum), 1363-64 (discussing media access or compelled
media speech), 1389-1409 (section entitled "Regulating the Press to 'Improve' the Mar-
ketplace of Ideas," including Tornillo, Red Lion, and Turner I and II).
262. The total CHOPER, supra note 1, speech pages include 569-1032 (Chapter 7:
"Freedom of Expression and Association") excluding, as I do in the sample, freedom of
association pages, 961-1005. The electronic media speech pages include 915-61 (Chapter
7:8: "The Electronic Media").
263. The total ROTUNDA, supra note 246, speech pages include 963-1340 (Chapter 10:
"Freedom of Speech"), while I exclude 1205-1247. The electronic media speech pages
include 1092-1113 (Tornillo and League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984), and
others); 1303-04 (Sable, Playboy); 1309-10 (Aschroft v. Free Speech Coalition); 1316-29
(Reno v. ACLU).
264. The total CHEMERINSKY, supra note 247, speech pages including 895-1236
("Freedom of Expression"), from which I exclude association, 1180-1200. The electronic
media speech pages include 904-07 (Turner ), 1039-55 (Pacifica, Sable, Reno v. ACLU,
Denver Area, Playboy), 1157-61 (Ark Educ.), 1216-22 (Red Lion, Tornillo).
265. The total VAN ALSTYNE, supra note 251, speech pages include 1-820. The elec-
tronic media speech pages include 200-03 (Tornillo), 476-5 10 (Red Lion, Turner, Denver
Area), 802-11 (Reno v. ACLU).
266. The total VOLOKH, supra note 249, speech pages include 1-588. The electronic
media speech pages include 43 (Reno v. ACLU); 203, 221-32 (copyright and right of pub-
licity, including Harper & Row Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985)), and
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1997)); 169 (Free Speech Coali-
2005)
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The general range, then, is between 5 and 12 percent of the free speech
pages. These low percentages, however, may paint a falsely optimistic picture
because many of the electronic media pages focus on indecency.
Before reading these casebooks, students might think that electronic media
implicates questions of who gets to speak to whom in society (organizationally,
functionally, or theoretically), and that electronic media generally affect politics,
autonomy, or the search for truth. But electronic media as defined in the case-
books are largely concemed with sexual speech--electronic smut targeted by
government. Smut cases, however, involve content, and do not address structural
regulation or conflicting private speech rights.267 The following chart shows the
ratio of electronic media indecency pages to overall electronic media pages.
Textbook Indecency Ratio Percentage
Sullivan261 25/55 45.45%
Stone269  13/39 33.33%
Choper 70  26/47 55.32%
Rotunda 27" 18/40 45.00%
Chemerinsky 272 17/33 51.52%
Van Alstyne 2 3  10/49 20.41%
Volokh 2  22/65 33.85%
tion v. Reno, 198 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 1999)); 279-82 (Problem: Violence on Television;
Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989)); 421 (Ark Educ.), 436-40
(League of Women Voters, discussing just the subsidy aspects); 477-501 ("Government as
Regulator of the Airwaves," including Red Lion, Tornillo, Pacifica, Reno v. ACLU, and
problems); 510-13 (Reno v. ACLU) (discussingjust vagueness); 546-48 (discussing speech
compulsions, violence ratings on television); 555-56 (discussing web page response law);
571-74 (Turner I, on compelled speech); 581-82 (television identification requirements).
267. Where a case is printed both in an indecency section and elsewhere, I only count
it in the indecency section. I do not wish to overstate the indecency obsession accompany-
ing electronic media in these textbooks, and partly because sections excerpted elsewhere
likely focus less on the indecency per se. Again, where a page contains only a paragraph
on indecency, I have counted it as an indecency page, for consistency, and thus many of
the pages are included as electronic media pages simply because of such paragraphs.
268. The SULLIVAN, supra note 29, electronic media indecency speech includes:
1138-58; 1332-33; 1340-41.
269. The STONE, supra note 143, electronic media indecency speech includes: 1192-
1204.
270. The CHOPER, supra note 1, electronic media indecency speech includes: 936-44
(Pacifica), 945-61 (Sable, Denver, Reno v. ACLU).
271. The ROTUNDA, supra note 246, electronic media indecency speech includes:
1303-04; 1309-10; 1316-29.
272. The CHEMERINSKY, supra note 247, electronic media indecency speech includes:
1039-55.
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Six of the seven texts devote from a third to over a half of their elec-
tronic media pages to indecency. The other devotes a fifth. The implication,
then, is that electronic media are not where almost all public discourse occurs.
Electronic media are where Americans get their smut.
The casebooks' focus on Supreme Court cases does not account for this
discrepancy. Although the editors may have a lot of electronic media inde-
275
cency cases as material, they also have many cases, especially broadcast
cases since the 1940s, which turn on structural regulations as well as political
speech. It does not matter that other casebooks, such as telecommunications
casebooks, may include more electronic media cases. The central point is that
free speech in American society happens through electronic media, and the
study of free speech law should reflect that.
2. Sample of Casebooks
When one turns from the casebooks' number of pages to their content,
some general themes emerge. First, electronic media cases not only receive
little space, they are generally segregated in sections announcing them as
"special" or "exceptional." Broadcast has "special problems" whereas hate
speech is apparently an ordinary problem. Second, the "special" "exception"
is usually labeled as pertaining only to broadcast even when cable and the
internet are also included in the broadcast subsection. This implies that
broadcast is left aside as a particularly special exception while other media
should or do follow print/property principles. The books' universal hope,
implicitly or explicitly, seems to be that future media will choose the "ordi-
nary" print model and not the "special" broadcast model. Third, broadcast
and cable cases are often edited and presented with a focus on the technologi-
cal facts of the industries, making the cases seem not only "special" but also
highly technical.276 Fourth, copyright issues receive scant attention as speech
277issues even though the concept and law of copyright is important for free
278
speech.
274. The VOLOKH, supra note 249, electronic media indecency speech includes: 43
(Reno v. ACLU), 169 (Free Speech Coalition v. Reno), 279-82 (Sable), 486-501 (Pacifica,
Reno v. ACLU).
275. See, e.g., DERRICK A. BELL, JR., CONsTrruTioNAL CoNFLicTs 422-24 (1997).
276. I thank Matthew Heckman for this point.
277. An exception is VOLOKH, supra note 249, at 221-29.
278. Robert S. Boynton, The Tyranny of Copyright?, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 25, 2004, § 6
(Magazine), at 40, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/01/25/magazine/25COPYRI
GHT.html?ex= 1390366800&en=9eb265b I f26e8b 14&ei=5007&partner=USERLAND.
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a. Sullivan
As listed above, Sullivan devotes few speech pages to electronic media,
and almost half are indecency pages. Sullivan's structure and headings also
betray her focus on non-electronic media. She discusses freedom of speech in
chapters 1 1 through 13, centering on how and why government restricts
speech. Chapter 1 1 addresses "why government restricts speech," and Chap-
ter 12 addresses "how" it does, while Chapter 13 addresses "rights ancillary
to the freedom of speech." The first two chapters, for non-"ancillary" rights,
address paper tradition's key issues: incitement, fighting words, reputation
harms, sexual expression, and commercial speech are discussed in Chapter
11, and the content distinction, government's power to limit speech in differ-
ent roles, and overbreadth and vagueness are discussed in Chapter 12. Mean-
while, the "Rights Ancillary to Freedom of Speech" include compelled
speech (including media access), campaign finance, and finally freedom of
the press. In short, the "ancillary" speech rights are central to democracy and
how Americans communicate and gather information in society.
The last of the ancillary rights sections is freedom of the press, and has
four subsections itself. These are press access to government information,
government demands for press information, laws discriminating against the
press, and (the last subsection of the last section of the last chapter on speech)
electronic media regulation. This last section has two parts, the first concern-
ing broadcast, the second concerning cable and the intemet. Naturally, this
section on electronic media is shorter than the discussion on indecency
through such media, in a different section.279
In keeping with the space allocation and structure, the content heavily
favors paper tradition. The last speech subsection is entitled "Differential
Regulation of the Broadcast Media., 280 The regulation is "differential," that
is, relative to the supposedly ordinary regulation of the previous sections.
Moreover, the title suggests electronic media do not have unifying themes
and that broadcast is merely unique. The chapter addresses broadcast, cable,
and the internet, but this title mentions only broadcast.
Sullivan takes the vantage point of the broadcasters. It is their speech
rights that concern her, and it is largely through their eyes that the reader sees
doctrine. Sullivan states that in "both Pacifica and Red Lion, the Court upheld
restrictions upon broadcasters that would have been impermissible if imposed
on those seeking to communicate by print.",281 This is not quite accurate; the
restrictions would have been impermissible not for those "seeking to commu-
nicate by print" (that would include access-seekers), but for those who owned
a newspaper.
279. SULLIVAN, supra note 29, at xix-xx.
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As a result, Sullivan tends to ignore the rights, privileges, and benefits
for access-seekers and listeners. She focuses on two main parties: the infra-
structure-owner and the government. She refers several times to the govern-
ment "impos[ing]"access "obligations on" the broadcasters, including in the
title to the first heading for Red Lion's discussion.282 Indeed, her paragraph
following this first heading, directly preceding the Red Lion discussion, oddly
does not mention listeners' interests at all. She presents the issue merely as
turning on government attempts to "safeguard individual reputations. 2 83 She
ignores the part of the fairness doctrine that required presenting both sides of
an issue. She even compares Red Lion's willingness to protect reputations,
the only concern she mentions, with doctrines providing the media protection
284from libel actions. Red Lion, of course, did not rest simply on the access-
seeker's reputational harm; it centered on listeners as well, and on their right
to receive diverse viewpoints and ideas.
After suggesting Red Lion's only concerns were "individual reputations"
and a broadcaster's free speech, she then asks, "May government regulate the
media with the aim of improving the marketplace of ideas? ' 285 This question
has an apparent bias. Most readers would probably oppose "government regu-
lat[ing]" any speech, especially at the end of three free speech chapters.
Moreover, using the marketplace metaphor here undercuts "regulation." Gov-
ernments do not regulate markets to "improve" them; in theory, they do so in
286
specific situations to correct market imperfections.
To make sense of Red Lion, Sullivan focuses on technological scarcity,
though she reprints Red Lion passages suggesting its wider reach. She begins
the "Differential" section with a discussion of broadcast technology and, in
presenting Red Lion, prints two paragraphs from Red Lion's decision focused
specifically on technology. 287 Although Sullivan does not reprint some of Red
Lion's more sweeping language favoring the fairness doctrine, she reprints
some passages revealing that the case is not concerned merely with reputa-
tional harm (but also with "multiplying the voices and views" for the public),
with technology (but also with other "channels of communication"), and with
broadcasters (but also with the "public").28 ' With little analysis, she quotes
and presents four paragraphs of Red Lion not focused on technology: 1)
"there is no sanctuary in the First Amendment for unlimited private censor-
ship" in broadcast; 2) there is no evidence the doctrine will censor broadcast-
ers; 3) government could obligate broadcasters to give time and attention to
matters of great public concern; and 4) apart from technological or economic
282. Id. at 1490-91.




287. Id. at 1490-91.
288. Id. at 1492.
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scarcity, "Congress does not abridge freedom of speech or press by legisla-
tion directly or indirectly multiplying the voices and views presented to the
public through... devices which limit or dissipate the power of those who sit
astride the channels of communication. 289
Sullivan follows these passages by essentially calling Red Lion mis-
taken. The line following the Red Lion presentation is: "[f]or commentary on
the problems raised by Red Lion, see [citing three articles]. On the fairness
doctrine generally, see [citing three cases]., 290 Thus, she assumes the case
created "problems," and directs the reader to articles presenting that view,
while not suggesting that it created benefits or citing sources for that view.
Just as Sullivan makes sense of Red Lion through technology, she limits
it through technology. The second heading in the Red Lion discussion, after
mentioning it raised problems, is "The limits of Red Lion."29' These limits are
technological: Red Lion "emphasized technological scarcity. '292 She suggests
Red Lion has no implications for other cases, such as those involving eco-
nomic scarcity, because the 'access advocates"' failed in Tornillo.293
The next heading discusses the repeal of the fairness doctrine as though
the repeal is an unqualified good. She mentions that the doctrine "was subject
to considerable criticism," but does not mention any of its support in public or
in Congress. 29 4 Instead, she notes that "[b]roadcasters resisted being treated
less protectively than other media" (meaning "media owners") 295 ; she notes
that "[slome observers" suggested the doctrine made broadcasters avoid con-
troversy (which is something advertising also does),296 was not administrable,
297and was obsolete. She mentions no one, and no reason, in its favor. She
quotes the FCC chairman, without criticism or discussion, on its repeal: "The
First Amendment does not guarantee a fair press, only a free press. 298 She
does not ask the question that Jerome Barron asked-a free press for whom-
nor the question of what kind of free press.299 She then suggests that the
Court, in CBS v. Democratic National Committee,300 concluded that the First
Amendment, by itself, without FCC regulation, does not mandate access. 3° 1
With "New Media," or cable and the internet, Sullivan asks if courts
should apply "traditional First Amendment principles," meaning apparently
289. Id.






296. See BAKER, ADVERTISING, supra note 157, at 56-58.
297. SULLIVAN, supra note 29, at 1493.
298. Id.
299. Benkler, Users, supra note 30, at 566 & n.22.
300. 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
301. SULLIVAN, supra note 29, at 1490-94.
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paper tradition principles rather than communication tradition principles.
302
She begins the discussion of cable by distinguishing its technology from
broadcast's. Again, she takes the vantage point not of cable viewers or inde-
pendent speakers but of the cable industry. She says, the "cable industry ar-
gued against [the] application of Red Lion or any other lesser standard of
protection," 303 but she does not present the arguments of opposing speakers,
or that Red Lion would provide these opposing speakers with a higher stan-
dard of protection. Instead, she presents the argument against the cable indus-
try's position, without presenting the speakers who advocate this position,
and centers on cable's connection to property rights, "including [government]
rights-of-way over streets. 30 4 Again, property is central.
Sullivan presents Turner I and Denver Area as triumphantly deviating
from Red Lion. She presents passages of Turner focusing on the technological
difference between broadcast and cable. Sullivan says the Court applied "or-
dinary principles '30 5 to cable, apparently distinguished from broadcast's un-
ordinary principles. These ordinary principles, however, also turn on cable's
"particular characteristics," which are either technological or economic. She
quotes the majority that, because a cable operator can "silence the voice of
competing speakers with a mere flick of the switch," the "potential for abuse
of this private power over a central avenue of communication cannot be over-
looked., 30 6 This quote shows concern for private speech power and the ex-
cluded speech of non-infrastructure-owners, but Sullivan's commentary does
not emphasize (or discuss) this concern. Here Sullivan also does not present
Turner 11, whose rhetoric treats the cable operators with less solicitude.30 7
Instead, Sullivan equates the rights of cable operators with First
Amendment protection of "cable" in general. She says that Justice Clarence
Thomas, in his Denver Area dissent, would prefer to state that "cable's First
Amendment protection was equivalent" to the print press.308 His dissent
strongly favors paper tradition principles; Sullivan devotes twice as much
space to this dissent as she does to the plurality opinion.
309
Sullivan then suggests that public access and leased channels are uncon-
stitutional, though Denver Area did not address the question. She devotes the
next paragraph to a question "not directly in issue" in Denver Area, but which
310Justice Thomas addressed in his dissent. Justice Thomas questioned the
constitutionality of public and leased-access channels, calling them a "type of
302. Id. at 1496.
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Id. at 1498.
306. Id.
307. See, e.g., VAN ALSTYNE, supra note 251, at 500-01.
308. SULLIVAN, supra note 29, at 1498.
309. Id.
310. Id. at 1499.
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forced speech."3 1' The following paragraph presents Justice Anthony Ken-
nedy's opposing view that the channels are constitutional and should be
treated as public fora. For him, as for Congress which he quotes, the access-
seeker and not the cable operator is the leafleteer 31 2 In the next paragraph,
after presenting these two views, Sullivan asks a paper tradition question
about Justice Kennedy's conclusion (if they are public fora, must hate speech
be allowed on such channels), and concludes with Justice Thomas's property-
based response to Justice Kennedy's conclusion: "[n]ote Justice Thomas'
reply ... : [Cable] systems are not public property. Cable systems are pri-
vately owned and privately managed. 313 A "formal easement or other prop-
erty right," he wrote, is necessary to declare fora public.3 1 4 Again, the privi-
leged position focuses on property, not speech.
In discussing the internet, Sullivan focuses on content regulation, not the
more difficult questions of structural regulation. She refers to "[p]roponents
of regulation" who fear the dissemination of pornography, copyright in-
fringement, and harassment.3 15 In response, opponents of regulation advocate
letting "the market" correct these problems, without discussing the intricacies
and regulations of that market.3 16 She then discusses the many different tech-
nological features of different modes of communication through the internet
and discusses possible analogies to other media.31 7 She reprints passages from
Reno v. ACLU, a content rather than structural regulation case, quoting the
majority's rejection of any lower level of scrutiny for content on the inter-
net.
318
Other sections make clear Sullivan's privileging of speech rights of
property owners, coupled with limiting Red Lion to its facts. The "compelled
speech" section has essentially two parts, one about compelling individuals,
the other about compelling organizations. The second part is called "Com-
pelled Access for the Speech of Others. 31 9 This views speech from the
owner's vantage point: the "[o]thers" are parties that do not own the commu-
nication property. Referring to the access as "[c]ompelled" also emphasizes
government action against one speaker (the property owner), and not in favor
of a different speaker, who is not being compelled but helped. The first para-
graph in this second part mentions Red Lion; directs the reader forward to the
last section, where Red Lion is presented; and limits Red Lion by saying it





315. Id. at 1500.
316. Id.
317. Id. at 1500-01.
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imposing forced access rights on unwilling media. 3 20 On top of immediately
limiting Red Lion with technology, this phrase is tellingly redundant;
"forced" and "unwilling" merely shape how the reader frames the issue. For
example, imposing "reply" access rights on "one-sided" media would present
the reader a different frame. Following this paragraph that dismisses Red
Lion, Sullivan presents non-broadcast cases: Tornillo; a shopping mall case
permitting access; 321 a case involving company mailings that followed Torn-
illo's logic; 322 and then the Turner cases. She presents the Turner cases
evenly but within the paper tradition narrative. It is a case involving the com-
pelled speech of the property owner-the cable operator.
Finally, Sullivan devotes much of the electronic media attention to inde-
cency. She treats the indecency cases as largely comparable to cases involv-
ing local zoning ordinances for sexual dancing: "outright bans are invalidated
but some partial regulations are upheld.,
323
b. Stone
Stone's speech section is entitled "Freedom of Expression,, 324 with
freedom of the press having a subsection.3 25 The electronic media section
proceeds from print rule to electronic exceptions. 326 The electronic media
section title, "Regulating the Press to 'Improve' the Marketplace of Ideas, 327
demonstrates how the electronic media issues are framed. First, "regulat[ion]"
feels ominous. This section comes at the end of hundreds of pages painting
First Amendment "regulation" as censorial. Second, the object of regulation
is purportedly "the press," which seems singled out in the title for special
regulation. The chapter, of course, primarily addresses broadcast licensees
and cable system operators, not journalists or other press representatives.
Third, the characterization of "improv[ing]" the "marketplace" of ideas re-
minds one that regulation does not "improve" markets. The usual justifica-
tions for regulation are market failures, not market "improvement." Fourth,
the title implies that electronic media speech law is based on the marketplace
of ideas rationale, 32 and not on democracy 329 or autonomy.33° The electronic
320. Id.
321. Id. at 1378-79 (presenting Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74
(1980)).
322. Id. at 1379-81 (presenting Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 475 U.S.
1(1986)).
323. Id. at 1138.
324. STONE, supra note 143, at 993.
325. Id. at 1365.
326. Id. at 1405-08.
327. Id. at 1389.
328. Many communication tradition advocates criticize the marketplace rationale as
descriptively inaccurate and normatively hopeless, and base arguments on other rationales.
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media section begins, following this heading, by asking: "In what circum-
stances, if any, is it appropriate for government to regulate the media in order
to 'improve' the system of free expression? '33' (Interestingly, Sullivan asked
almost the same question: "May government regulate the media with the aim
of improving the marketplace of ideas?")332
Following this first sentence are a set of cases and discussions, begin-
ning with the "rule," print media (Tornillo), followed with the broadcast ex-
ception (Red Lion), cable exception (Turner I and I), and then cyberspace.33 3
The prevailing question is, Should "ordinary" pamphlet/parade/print princi-
ples apply to new media, or should these media principles (characterized by
the book as restrictive, and peripheral) apply instead?334
At one point, Stone argues that a broadcaster is a speaker, but is not a
speaker, and at any rate, paper tradition should apply:
In 1987, the FCC repealed the fairness doctrine, asserting that the
doctrine was unconstitutional because it "chilled" the first amend-
ment rights of broadcasters. Reflecting the FCC's market-oriented
position at the time it repealed the fairness doctrine, Chair Mark
Fowler remarked that "television is just another appliance. It's a
toaster with pictures.
335
The second sentence departs from the first, shifting focus from broad-
casters' speech (which can be chilled) to implying the speech is as significant
as toasters' speech, so free speech doctrine should not concern itself with the
toasters' pictures.
Beyond the electronic media subsection, Stone's choice of titles empha-
sizes the content-based line. The headings for three of the six freedom of
expression sections include the word "content-based" or "content-neutral. 336
Stone does, however, question the content-based line in discussing electronic
media speech, devoting several paragraphs to "Turner and the problem of
content," which drew from Baker's 337 and Sunstein's respective models of
speech.338
See Weinberg, supra note 9, at 1157-64. See works cited in SULLIVAN, supra note 29, at
988-89.
329. As Sunstein argues. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 10.
330. As Benkler argues. See Benkler, Siren Songs, supra note 27.
331. STONE, supra note 143, at 1389 (emphasis added).
332. SULLIVAN, supra note 29, at 1491.
333. STONE, supra note 143, at 1389-1408.
334. Id. at 1407.
335. Id. at 1397.
336. Id. at xi.
337. Id. at 1402 (citing Baker, supra note 20, at 61, 66, 72, 91).
338. See id. (citing Sunstein, supra note 10, at 1767-68).
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Choper's casebook provides the quote about utility poles that begins this
Article. Its text segregates electronic media into their own section. Choper
addresses electronic media more comprehensively than other casebooks dis-
cussed here. Unlike other casebooks, Choper's section heading does not refer
to electronic media's "specialness., 339 Further, Choper addresses more than
merely access to mass media by including a section on content-regulation.
Moreover, there is some overlap of sections, indicating media access's possi-
ble effect on content.3 4 °
Choper downplays spectrum scarcity as a rationale. "Scarcity" is usually
used to confine Red Lion's principles to broadcast. Choper emphasizes the
pervasiveness rationale of Pacifica341 and explicitly wonders if the "power-
ful" effect of broadcast may color the Court's decisions. 42 Regarding cable,
he quotes Jerome Barron as saying that "'it is not intuitively obvious that
cable operators enjoy the whole panoply of First Amendment rights.'
3 43
Other books tend to hint (often through silence) that the "full panoply" is the
intuitive rule for infrastructure-owners, and that deviation requires substantial
justification. Choper quotes an author criticizing the "'[o]ffhand comments
about broadcasting enjoying "the most limited" First Amendment protec-
tion"': "'[w]hat of comic books. . . [or] Chinese cookie fortunes?'
344
Nonetheless, Choper devotes little space to electronic media speech, af-
ter devoting most attention to advocacy of illegal action, false light, obscen-
ity, fighting words, flag burning, indecent speech, commercial speech, "Hate
Speech Revisited-Again, 3 45 and utility poles.
d. Rotunda
Rotunda characterizes Red Lion as abnormal, and limited to broadcast.
The short section that includes cable and broadcast speech is the fifth of
twelve speech sections, and entitled "Distinguishing Print from Broadcast
Media. 3 46 In this section, he presents two cases, and notes to those cases.
339. CHOPER, supra note l, at 915.
340. Id. at 953. Choper treats Denver Area partly as an indecency (i.e., content) case
and partly as an access case.
341. Id. at 944.
342. Id.
343. Id. at 953-54 (quoting Jerome A. Barron, The Electronic Media and the Flight
From First Amendment Doctrine: Justice Breyer's New Balancing Approach, 31 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 817, 868, 870 (1998)).
344. Id. at 944 (quoting Daniel Brenner, Censoring the Airwaves: The Supreme
Court's Pacifica Decision, in FREE BUT REGULATED: CONFLICTING TRADITIONS IN MEDIA
LAW 175, 177, 179 (1982)).
345. Id. at xx-xxvi.
346. ROTuNDA, supra note 246, at 1092.
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The two cases are, first, Tornillo, and second, FCC v. League of Women Vot-
ers of California.347 League of Women Voters, not Red Lion, represents the
broadcast exception. This case struck down regulations on public broadcast
stations that forbid them from editorializing if they accepted government
grants. 348 The passages reprinted from League of Women Voters distinguish
broadcast from other media, and note that "although the broadcasting industry
plainly operates under restraints not imposed upon other media, the thrust of
these restrictions has generally been to secure the public's First Amendment
interest in receiving a balanced presentation of views on diverse matters. 349
The majority also concluded the regulations were unnecessarily drastic in part
because the fairness doctrine provided beneficial balance.350
In the notes following League of Women Voters, Rotunda discusses Red
Lion briefly. 3 5 1 Rotunda recounts that Congress eventually passed a statute to
make the fairness doctrine permanent, but President Ronald Reagan vetoed it
"as unconstitutional. 3 52 Of the eight lines in this note, four discuss this
veto. 353 Rotunda quotes part of the president's veto message, as though the
president, and not the unanimous Supreme Court in Red Lion, was the author-
ity on the doctrine's constitutionality: "'This type of content-based regulation
by the federal government is, in my judgment, antagonistic to the freedom of
expression guaranteed' by the Constitution. ' '35 4 Rotunda then moves on. The
other notes are generally balanced.355
Unlike cable, the internet is not included in the section distinguishing
broadcast. Instead, "The Internet" is the heading of a subsection on "Obscen-
ity." 356 The internet discussion consists of roughly thirteen pages of Reno v.
A CL U passages357 and short notes following these pages, discussing the sub-
sequent posture of the case.358 Rotunda then moves on to other topics in ob-
scenity, like public indecency, which follows "The Internet. 3 59
347. 468 U.S. 364 (1984).
348. Id.
349. ROTUNDA, supra note 246, at 1099-1100 (from League of Women Voters).
350. Id. at 1104 (from League of Women Voters).
351. Id. at 1109-10.
352. Id. at 1110.
353. Id.
354. Id.
355. The notes also present Pacifica, the Turner cases, Denver Area, and others. Id at
1108-13.
356. ROTUNDA, supra note 246, at 1316.
357. Id. at 1316-28.
358. Id. at 1328-29.
359. Id. at 1329.
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Chemerinsky devotes little space to electronic media, and criticizes
communication tradition doctrine in those passages. The free speech chapter's
overall structure favors paper tradition: it is entitled "First Amendment: Free-
dom of Expression, 3 60 and establishes the centrality of the content-
based/neutral distinction early in the chapter.36' Moreover, Chemerinsky pre-
sents electronic media largely in the indecency sections.
362
Chemerinsky does not transparently criticize electronic media regula-
tion, but suggests a slight privileging of Tornillo. He presents only two struc-
tural regulation cases, Red Lion and Tornillo.36 3 The presentation does not
focus on broad issues, like structural regulation or (less broadly) access, but
on the narrow subject of right-of-reply rules. In framing the two cases, he
writes:
A distinct issue arises concerning laws that attempt to regulate the
press and require that it allow others to use it. Can the govermment
require that the media make newspaper space or broadcast time
available to respond to personal attacks?
364
Following the cases, he states the upshot of the "distinct issue": "Right-
to-reply laws are allowed as to the broadcast media, but not the print me-
dia. 3 65 He then contrasts Tornillo and Red Lion, saying the distinction be-
tween the two "seems to be based on the inherent scarcity of the broadcast
media.' 366 He criticizes this rationale as false, both economically and techno-
logically.367 Economically, newspapers are even more scarce than broadcast-
ers in many cities.368 Technologically, cable television and direct broadcast
satellites undermine scarcity, "even if [scarcity] was ever true. 3 69 He then370
notes that the FCC repealed the fairness doctrine requiring access.
Chemerinsky does not, however, criticize Tornillo. He did not present
any factor in Tornillo that would distinguish it from Red Lion: it is normal,
while Red Lion turns on scarcity. He does not discuss Red Lion's conclusion
that the interests of viewers are paramount, or base the distinction on the in-
terests on viewers. He does not scrutinize Tornillo at all in discussing the
360. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 247, at 895.
361. Id. at 903.
362. Id. at 1039-55.
363. Id. at 1216-22.
364. Id. at 1216.
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distinction. Following this discussion, he asks, "If the distinction between the
print and broadcast media is rejected," which case should apply "to both me-
dia"?371 He then states two sides of the debate:
Allowing right to reply laws has the benefit of enhancing the view-
points that are heard. But such laws also intrude on a crucial First
Amendment value: press autonomy to decide what to publish.372
The subtle contrast of these sentences is striking. The first, presenting
what he lists as the one benefit of reply laws, features a passive verb, and no
noun-subject for the verb "heard." Instead of saying the laws "enhance the
viewpoints that Americans (the public, citizens, voters, etc.) hear," the laws
"ha[ve] the benefit of enhancing" viewpoints "that are heard." This viewpoint
diversity is not called "a crucial First Amendment value," despite its central-
ity to free speech cases. The second sentence begins with the strong "[b]ut,"
has the active verb "intrude," and presents what it calls a "crucial First
Amendment value" against reply laws.
Nonetheless, the worst part of Chemerinsky's brief space devoted to
electronic media is how brief it is.
f. Van Alstyne
Van Alstyne devotes very little space to electronic media, less than 6
percent. His discussion clearly casts Red Lion as exceptional and in desperate
need of justification, while casting Tornillo as a well-decided case. For news-
papers, broadcast, and cable, he presents speech issues with the infrastruc-
ture-owner as protagonist, and through the owner's eyes. In conjunction, he
locates speech rights in property rights and discusses property at length, as-
suming property's centrality to freedom of speech.
Van Alstyne presents Tornillo as a "very strong" First Amendment case,
turning on property and contract issues.373 Unlike most other casebooks, Van
Alstyne's places Tornillo in the section on libel.374 He presents Tornillo in the
tradition of the celebrated libel case, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,375 and
emphasizes that the right-of-reply in Tornillo did not meet Sullivan's stan-




373. VAN ALSTYNE, supra note 251, at 203.
374. Id. at 200-04.
375. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
376. VAN ALSTYNE, supra note 251, at 203.
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Tornillo is surely a very strong case insofar as it interprets the first
amendment to reserve to each privately owned publication an edi-
torial autonomy to decide what it will and will not publish.377
Tornillo receives praise, as "surely a very strong case," apparently be-
cause it respects property rights (of a "privately owned publication").
Van Alstyne also suggests Tornillo's correctness based on contract law.
He suggested that had the newspaper in Tornillo previously contracted to a
right-of-reply through private bargaining, or a court order, the newspaper
would have had less, or no, First Amendment defense.378
Van Alstyne's Red Lion discussion similarly turns on property rights,
perhaps more than speech rights. For example, Van Alstyne categorizes Red
Lion in a section on the "Government's Management of Public Property: First
Amendment Rights of Access and Use, 379 in a subsection called "Who Owns
the Airwaves? '380 The discussion of airwaves is long and in-depth. He re-
prints four casebook pages' worth from Red Lion,38 1 and follows this with
eight pages of notes and discussion on Red Lion and Tornillo.382 Through this
long discussion, as the heading suggests, property remains the key theme.
The notes following Red Lion distinguish it from Tornillo, assuming
383Tornillo's preferability. He assumes Tornillo is the rule, and attempts to
distinguish, and cabin, Red Lion as a result.384 The first line of the notes is
"Red Lion[] should immediately bring to mind (for comparison and contrast)"
Tornillo, which he notes was "unanimous," while not noting the same of Red
Lion.38' He then proffers a distinction between the two cases, which he
quickly rejects for another distinction. First, he distinguishes the two based on
technology: Tornillo involved newspapers, and thus perhaps the press clause,
386
while Red Lion involved a different technology. But, he says, despite the
other casebooks' emphasis on a technological distinction, "by itself, that dis-
tinction seems extremely weak .... [T]his suggested distinction would not
appear to explain the differences between two cases. 387
Van Alstyne claims, rather, that Red Lion is "expressly distinguished,"
through language in Red Lion, based on broadcast involving "government-
owned or government-managed public property. 388 Like other casebooks,
377. Id.
378. Id. at 203-04.
379. Id. at 373.
380. Id. at 476.
381. Id. at 476-79.
382. Id. at 480-87.
383. Id. at 480.
384. Id. at 480-87.
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Van Alstyne downplays the claims of the access-seekers and government's
structuring role. He spends several paragraphs and pages distinguishing Red
Lion based on government's "socialized" property, especially because the
government allocated frequencies for free. 3 89 He explicitly distinguishes Red
Lion from Tornillo because the government essentially allocated property-like
rights in spectrum, while in Tornillo it merely enforced a conception of prop-
erty rights for newspapers.39° He suggests that had the government charged
the broadcasters for their use, the charge would affect their First Amendment
claims because broadcasters would have essentially received property (and
speech) rights through the fee.39' That is, one could argue, he says, especially
based on paper tradition's doctrine, that "the price paid by the successful bid-
der would make the 'property' private property for first amendment pur-
poses. 392
This extended discussion to limit Red Lion suggests it is unordinary and
highly limited. Having limited the case based on government granting use-
for free-of public property, he writes, "[v]iewed this way, the case may
seem both easy and right. 3 93 This suggests that when viewed in more general
ways, the case may not seem "right." As a result, "from this [limited] per-
spective," Red Lion is "a very modest" case. 39 4 It is so "modest," it is almost
limited to its facts. Going forward, he presumes the "easy and right" spin on
Red Lion, and "viewed this way," raises several questions.
Of these questions, the first two, along with a footnote, slightly favor
communication tradition, at least more heavily than other casebooks' takes on
the same issues. Although other casebooks emphasize that the FCC has aban-
doned the fairness doctrine, Van Alstyne notes that the FCC still enforces
regulations similar to the fairness doctrine, such as regulations for candi-
dates.395 He asks whether, if all fairness-doctrine-like rules were repealed, the
396First Amendment, by itself, would provide for access. Other casebooks
suggest that a case (CBS v. Democratic National Committee 397) already an-
swered this question. 398 Van Alstyne, by contrast, describes that case more
narrowly; the First Amendment alone was insufficient "in light of' the con-
tinued existence of the fairness doctrine then.399 Separately, Van Alstyne also
asks if the government could impose other "greater" restrictions, such as
389. VAN ALSTYNE, supra note 251, at 481.
390. Id.
391. Id. at 482.
392. Id. at 482 n.98.
393. Id. at 482.
394. Id.
395. Id. at 483 n.100.
396. Id. at 483.
397. 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
398. See, e.g., SULLIVAN, supra note 29, at 1493-94.
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common carrier obligations, on broadcast.400 Suggestions of greater restric-
tions on broadcasters, or greater freedom for non-infrastructure-owners, are
notably absent in other casebooks. In addition, a footnote in the questions
distinguishes Red Lion from Pacifica, emphasizing that Red Lion cannot jus-
41tify Pacifica.
The next three questions emphasize paper tradition ideas. The third
question asks if the fairness doctrine leads to self-censorship of the infrastruc-
ture-owner,40 z and the fourth emphasizes that "the [economic] market" appar-
ently works in magazine publishing (a convenient example, since magazines
are the least concentrated media4 3), and likely works toward speech purposes
everywhere else. 4°4 The fifth question argues that scarcity does not matter for
405broadcast because all economic goods are scarce. Society usually relies on
the market to allocate scarce resources, not government allocation. This con-
tinues his focus on property-based explanations of Red Lion.
Van Alstyne then turns to cable, also presenting it through a paper-
tradition lens. First, he presents the Turner cases and distinguishes them from
Red Lion based on public property as well as through broadcast technol-
406
ogy. He notes that cable operators do not have "exclusive" use of fre-
407quency. He does not discuss, however, the public property or contract is-
sues of local exclusive franchises for cable, which would apparently be rele-
vant in the paradigm of his Red Lion discussion.
After distinguishing Red Lion, which is the apparent exception, he asks
if government may "nonetheless presume to dictate to cable companies" what
to carry against their judgment.40 8 This loads the question, obviously, as
Americans do not prefer government "dictat[ing]" speech against a speaker's
judgment. It also ignores the possibility of the cable operators "dictat[ing]"
what their subscribers get to see and believe. Indeed, Van Alstyne suggests
that cable subscribers "might prefer a different selection of channels and pro-
grams" than the government would, 409 but does not indicate that they might
prefer a different selection than the cable operators would, based for example
on fee arrangements for different channels.
400. Id. at 483.
401. Id. at482 n.99.
402. Id. at 484.
403. Project for Excellence in Journalism, supra note 196, at http://www.stateoflhene
wsrnedia.org/narrative magazines-ownership.asp?cat=-5&media=7 (on magazine owner-
ship in 2004).
404. VAN ALSTYNE, supra note 251, at 484-85. For a critique of this position, see
BAKER, MEDIA, MARKETS, supra note 157.
405. VAN ALSTYNE, supra note 251, at 486.
406. Id. at 487-502.
407. Id. at 487.
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Van Alstyne does present long passages from Turner I, roughly ten
casebook pages.4 He also explains that Turner II was even more protective
411of the free speech rights of non-infrastructure-owners, though other case-
books do not make this development so clear.412
After presenting the Turner cases, he presents Denver Area largely
through the lens of paper tradition. Van Alstyne frames the issues as Justice
Thomas did in his dissent.
[The issue] was whether in changing its mind, in permitting cable
companies to refuse to carry certain material (even on the must-
carry channels), Congress acted to abridge freedom of speech-not
that of the cable company, rather, the freedom of speech of those
the cable company was previously required to carry unedited.
. . . When Congress merely "gives back" to cable companies
some portion of such control as they would have had more com-
pletely if Congress had simply left them alone in the first place...
wherein can one find grounds to frame a suitable.., complaint?4 13
This centers on the cable operator's viewpoint, and assumes that struc-
tural regulation violates operators' First Amendment rights. He suggests that
it is almost inconceivable for a non-infrastructure-owner to have a First
Amendment complaint, implying the implausibility of a speech claim that
was "not that of the cable" operator. He suggests that one perhaps cannot
"find grounds" for a "suitable complaint" here.
In privileging the cable operators' viewpoint, he also privileges their
speech rights through property. He frames the issue, as does Justice Thomas,
as merely returning to cable operators some of the speech control (over other
people's speech) that they should have already had based on their property
rights. Van Alstyne suggests, as well, that must-carry rules involve govern-
ment action-through them, "Congress had" not left cable operators "alone in
the first place." Yet, he does not suggest that government action could be
responsible for excluding speakers from cable. He considers the deliberate
exclusion of certain content from the (adjudged content-neutral) must-carry
rules to be "mere forbearance by Congress"; apparently Congress should
leave cable operators "alone" based on the free speech guarantee.4 14 In fact,
he does not seem to think the content-based nature of the exclusion matters
much. Only at the end of a three paragraph discussion does he mention that
the "certain material" excludable is indecent, a word he places in parentheses
410. Id. at 488-98.
411. Id. at 500-01.
412. See, e.g., SULLIVAN, supra note 29, at 1493-94.
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and quotation marks. 41 5 For him, the central issue for cable, as other media, is
whether the infrastructure-owner gets its supposed constitutional due against
others' asserted rights.
g. Volokh
The Volokh casebook has an innovative structure. Among other things,
it focuses on problem-examples, has an explicit focus on policy arguments,
has extra historical discussion, and includes a summary of law before the
speech sections.416
Like the other casebooks, however, it devotes little space to electronic
media, and it presents the electronic media through the lens of paper tradition.
For example, the rough outline of free speech doctrine on the first two pages
begins with and emphasizes two rules that are paramount in paper tradition:
1) the First Amendment turns only on government action, and 2) content-
based restrictions are presumptively invalid unless they fall into a doctrinal
exception.417
The casebook frames the electronic media cases with paper tradition
doctrine. The discussion of electronic media is largely centered in two sec-
tions, each with a title that fits perfectly with paper tradition's emphasis: "The
Government as Regulator of the Airwaves, 418 and "Speech Compulsions.,
419
The section on "Government as Regulator," as its title suggests, presumes
broadcast doctrine is government "regulat[ion]," and is based primarily on its
relationship to the "airwaves." The section's law summary states explicitly
that broadcast is exceptional: "This rule [the standard of scrutiny summarized
as similar to strict scrutiny at parts] is applicable only to broadcasting over
the airwaves," and "not to newspapers" or to "the Internet" or "even to cable
television. 42°
In discussing government airwaves regulation, the text focuses on the
pernicious effects of content censorship, not on structural regulation. Its first
posed "problem" involves censoring songs on the internet that glorify drugs;
it poses no structural regulation problems.42t Similarly, it devotes fifteen
pages to Pacifica-an indecent-content case-and one third that to Red
Lion.422 Much of Pacifica's space presents the dissent, and Mr. Carlin's
speech; nonetheless, Pacifica, the indecency case, appears as the central case
in broadcast regulation.
415. Id. at 502.
416. VOLOKH, supra note 249, at vii-viii.
417. Id. at 1-2.
418. Id. at477.
419. Id. at 546.
420. Id. at 477.
421. Id. at 477-78.
422. Id. at 478-82,486-99.
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Once again, access regulation is placed doctrinally as compelled speech.
This means compelled speech, of course, of the infrastructure-owner, privi-
leging its speech. The summary of the "speech compulsion" section cites both
Turner I and Tornillo.423 Red Lion, which permitted "compelled speech," is
not cited.424 After the summary, among the edited cases, the reader is directed
to review Tornillo, 425 which was printed in the "Government as Regulator"
section. This pointer to Tornillo precedes Wooley v. Maynard,426 an individ-
ual forced-speech-on-a-license-plate case, and comes less than ten pages after
West Virginia v. Barnette,427 an individual school child flag-pledge case. This
suggests a similarity between media owners and these other free speech
claimants, which is doctrinally accepted in paper tradition, and which I dis-
cuss in greater detail with the Tribe treatise below. The Table of Cases in-
cludes neither Associated Press nor Denver Area.
B. Treatises
1. Tribe
Of the many constitutional law guides available to students, the most
popular and most quoted is Laurence Tribe's treatise, American Constitu-
tional Law.428 The treatise deserves special treatment, being the most cited
legal book (in any field) over at least the last twenty-five years,429 a "student
guide[],,'430 and the book generally acknowledged as the leading constitu-
tional treatise.
I analyze the second edition published in 1988 for the treatise's treat-
ment of freedom of speech. The second volume of the third edition has yet to
be published; and the first volume of the third edition does not address free
speech. The interet, as a result, plays no role in the text. The speech treat-
ment is primarily in the twelfth chapter, "Rights of Communication and Ex-
pression."
43 1
Tribe devotes little space to electronic media speech compared to the
space devoted to other speech. The chapter addressing speech is 277 pages
43243long, yet only nine pages explicitly discuss broadcast and cable433 and three
423. Id. at 546.
424. Id. at 546-47.
425. Id. at 556.
426. 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
427. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
428. See TRIBE, supra note 24.
429. See Shapiro, supra note 254, at 403 n.4.
430. Id. at 404.
431. See TRIBE, supra note 24, at 785.
432. Id. at 785-1061.
433. Id. at 1002-10.
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56
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 70, Iss. 1 [2005], Art. 7
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol70/iss1/7
ANOTHER WORTHY TRADITION
more address Pacifica.434 So 4.3 percent of the chapter discusses cable and
broadcast. This is despite referring to the voluminous evidence demonstrating
mass communications' impact, that the average family watches "TV for more
than a third of its waking hours," and that "television has become the primary
source of news for a majority of the population. 435
Tribe argues that government cannot force an owner to use its property
to convey a message. The structure of this argument is repeated in two
places. 436 He uses West Virginia v. Barnette437 and Wooley v. Maynard 438 to
draw analogies to media companies. In Barnette, the Supreme Court held that
a Jehovah's Witness child in public school could not be required to salute the
U.S. flag.43 9 In Wooley, the Court held unconstitutional a state statute requir-
ing motor vehicles to bear license plates with the words "Live Free or Die.
' 40
From both of these cases, Tribe derives broad principles. That is, unlike the
qualifiers used with Red Lion, Barnette is not the "schoolchild exception";
Wooley is not limited to the "unique medium" of personal automobile license
plates.
In the first presentation of this argument, one sentence after citing
Barnette, Tribe writes "government cannot compel an individual to display
on his person or property a message fostering public adherence to an ideo-
logical view the individual finds unacceptable [citing Wooley], and it may not
force a newspaper to print a story it does not want to print [citing Torn-
illo] .,,
The application of the "broad" principle extracted from Wooley and
Barnette to Tornillo seems surprising here: media access is not akin to forcing
schoolchildren and individual drivers to speak. Tribe ignores differences with
Wooley, like the type of property (an individual's private car versus business
property run for profit), the intents of the regulations (adherence to an ideol-
ogy versus reply space for balanced news), the content of the speech (slogan
versus response story), the speakers privileged by the regulation (government
versus primarily private speakers), or the cases' likely effects on general dis-
course. He ignores differences with Barnette, such as that school children are
considered impressionable (newspapers are not),442 the child had religious
objections (newspapers generally do not), and the Pledge of Allegiance is
clearly pro-government speech (responses may not be).443
434. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
435. TRIBE, supra note 24, at 1007.
436. See id. at 804, 1001-03.
437. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
438. 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
439. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624.
440. Wooley, 430 U.S. 705.
44 1. TRIBE, supra note 24, at 804.
442. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 20, at 62-63 (mentioning distinction between cable
operators and "schoolchildren during a flag ceremony").
443. Fiss, supra note 10, at 82-83.
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In addition, Tribe neglects to cite or mention Red Lion in this discussion
of compelled speech that includes Tornillo, Wooley, and Barnette. He does
not include a "but see," or a disclaimer for "special," "peripheral" rules that
allow "compelling" messages.
In the second presentation of this same argument, Tribe makes more ex-
plicit the Lochner-esque status of property ownership within paper tradition's
core. He also makes explicit his perception of Wooley's applicability to me-
dia, or at least to Tornillo.444 He quotes the Wooley Supreme Court, adding
emphasis where New Hampshire had compelled speakers to "'use their [own]
property' 445 (automobiles) to display "'the State's ideological message.'
446
On the following page, Tribe writes:
Given the historic function of newspapers and broadcasters as
speakers in their own right as well as conveyers of the messages of
others, the analogy to Wooley v. Maynard is considerably less
strained when one turns to attempts to subordinate the editorial
rights of the print or electronic media to the first amendment rights
of those with messages they wish to convey or of those with mes-
sages they wish to receive. In fact, the Court in Wooley relied in
part on [Tornillo], a decision which had unanimously upheld edito-
rial rights over rights of access." 7
Once again, Tribe makes the direct analogy from carrying a state mes-
sage on a personal car to media speech regulation. Three problems arise from
this passage. First, Tribe ignores the implications of his concession that
newspapers and broadcasters are "conveyers of messages of others." Auto-
mobile owners are not often considered conveyers of state ideological mes-
sages, or "mobile billboards." 448 This distinction could matter.449 Second,
Tribe mentions "print or electronic media" as though they are identical-but
on the next page he begins the task of limiting Red Lion. Third, Tribe pre-
sumes that the First Amendment must subordinate the rights of those "with
messages they wish to convey" or "receive" to the rights of those with prop-
erty. Red Lion, another unanimous Supreme Court case, declared the oppo-
450
site: the right of the viewers and listeners was paramount.
Tribe's discussion of access rights finally acknowledges Red Lion, al-
though Tribe marginalizes Red Lion in the space devoted to it. In a subsection
444. TRIBE, supra note 24, at 1001-02.
445. Id. at 1000 (quoting Wooley, 430 U.S. at 715).
446. Id. (quoting Wooley, 430 U.S. at 715).
447. Id. at 1001-02 (footnotes omitted).
448. Id. at 1000 (quoting Wooley, 430 U.S. at 715).
449. See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 655 (1994) (noting the
importance of cable's historic role of conveying broadcast messages and the lack of lis-
tener confusion as to whose message is conveyed).
450. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367,390 (1969).
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called, "Private Forums: From Shopping Centers to the Media,"SI Tribe
undercuts the argument for access. He states that Red Lion stressed the
"counter-dangers [of a no-access rule], and omitt[ed] any reference to the
tradition of unfettered editorial discretion for the print media." 's This unfet-
tered tradition may be inaccurate, as evidenced by many laws,453 including
the 1911 Nevada law providing newspaper access rights.454 Even if this unfet
tered tradition existed, it could not be a long tradition, as New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan455 is fairly recent. Moreover, if Baker is correct, Tornillo an-
nounced this "tradition" after Red Lion. Thus, Tribe may be wrong to call
Red Lion "a chain-breaking departure from the constitutional approach to
newspapers and magazines. 4 56 In the footnote to this sentence, he reprints
chosen quotes from scholars calling supporters of the fairness doctrine "hope-
lessly optimistic" and the doctrine itself a "major first amendment loss. ' 4 57
Instead of attempting to draw out principles from Red Lion to evaluate
how it affects free speech doctrine, Tribe emphasizes the supposed incompre-
hensibility of broadcast law. Perhaps because the law fails to fit within this
narrative of free speech doctrine, Tribe states its development is "simpler to
summarize than to comprehend. ,4S8 He quotes Holmes that "'a page of his-
tory is worth a volume of logic,"'' 459 but presents an apparently different his-
tory here than he presented earlier with the clear and present danger test.
There was a low level of speech protection prior to the 1930s, yet Tribe states
that the "first amendment guarantee of freedom from government intrusion
reigns most confidently in the realm of the print media, since newspapers and
pamphlets [along with pulpits and soap boxes46° ] were the most significant
modes of mass communication in the world of the Framers.",461 This does not
explain why print media receive more protection: by Tribe's depiction else-
where,4 62 the Framers did not always protect print from government intrusion.
Tribe paints a historical picture showing that access rights, or any gov-
ernment regulation on media infrastructure-owners, are intolerable speech
burdens. He says the First Amendment's "sweeping guarantees have been
most compromised in the realm of the most modem medium: electronic
broadcasting. ' '463 Notwithstanding cable, the sentence assumes that speech's
451. TRIBE, supra note 24, at 998.
452. Id. at 1002.
453. Baker, supra note 20, at 105-1I.
454. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
455. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
456. TRIBE, supra note 24, at 1003.
457. Id. at 1003 n.37.
458. Id. at 1003.
459. Id. (quoting N.Y. Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921)).
460. Id. at 1003 n.42.
461. Id. at 1003.
462. Id. at 863.
463. Id. at 1004.
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"sweeping guarantees" center on property-owners' rights and bar any gov-
ernment attempts to enhance discourse. Tribe spends the next pages focusing
on electromagnetic radiation and the government's role rather than on broad-
casters' speech or gatekeeping powers, seeming to lament that "government
design" affects broadcasters while it does not affect newspapers46 (which
also may not be quite accurate 465).
According to Tribe, cable cases "amount[] to an invitation to reconsider
the tension between the Supreme Court's radically divergent approaches to
the print and electronic media., 466 The implication from Tribe's structure,
space-allocation, and tone is that the tension should be reconsidered and
eliminated, and future media should follow print.
Tribe argues both sides of an empirical argument to reach the same con-
clusion-that media owners should be free from access requirements. Tribe
notes the supposed indeterminate impact of mass media to stress that owners
with even extraordinarily powerful speaking ability, like media corporations,
must be allowed to use this property to speak anyway they choose. He writes:
This cautionary note [media speech's indeterminacy] is all the
more reassuring because theories that maintain that some forms of
expression should be curtailed because they are unusually effective
in persuading listeners, or because of the speaker's identity, are
467
theories that run counter to important first amendment teachings.
This conclusion seems not to follow from its premise: it is unclear how
indeterminacy is related to the theories except as evidence and not as showing
which theories most conform to the First Amendment teachings. Nor does
Tribe note that speech is "curtailed" either way-for the newspaper or the
person seeking access. In the string cite following this sentence, Tribe cites
several commercial speech cases, a campaign finance case, a corporate
speech case, and Tornillo, with the brief parenthetical "(invalidating right of
reply statute)., 468 Apparently, the teachings of an uncited case, Red Lion, are
not "important" despite upholding a right-of-reply regulation.
While critiquing Red Lion, however, Tribe relies on broadcast's deter-
minative impact. Broadcast needs more First Amendment "protection," or
protection for the broadcasting property owners, because "the picture tube"
has "replaced" the "printing press. '469 He notes that "television has become
the primary source of news for a majority of the population., 470 As a result,
464. Id. at 1004-07.
465. Baker, supra note 20, at 105-11.
466. TRIBE, supra note 24, at 1005.
467. Id. at 809 n.16.
468. Id.
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Tribe laments that the "trouble lies in the fact that, although these powerful
new media have acquired the functions of the press, they have not yet ob-
tained the rights of the press. ' 471 No longer is electronic media's effect "inde-
terminate" and thus "all the more reassuring" that access is unnecessary.47 2
The effect is now "powerful," and thus access is intolerable.
Nonetheless, after limiting Red Lion's application, Tribe takes comfort
in Bollinger's perceptive method of treating electronic media and print media
as two different worlds acting together.473 Tribe hopes that the "danger of
escalating" regulation to intolerable levels will be averted or at least limited to
broadcast.4 74
Tribe also advances other paper tradition tenets, such as the content line,
rules, and treating corporations and individuals the same.475
2. Rotunda
The Rotunda treatise 4 7 6 is one of the ten most cited law books and the
second most popular constitutional law treatise.477 In the five volume Ro-
tunda treatise, 469 pages of the fourth volume cover freedom of speech 478 but
only 43 cover electronic media.479
Rotunda's treatment of Associated Press most clearly shows his support
for paper tradition principles. He treats the case narrowly, segregating it to a
section on "The Antitrust Laws" in "Other Regulation of the Press.' 4S° Ro-
tunda produces a well-known block quote from Associated Press, with an
addition in brackets in the following sentence to "clarify" the passage:
471. Id. (emphasis added).
472. Id. at 809 n.16.
473. Id. at 1009 (referring to Bollinger Jr., supra note 10).
474. Id. at 1010.
475. For content, see, for example, id. at 789, 790, 794, 836. For rules over balancing,
see id. at 703, 803. For corporations, see, for example, id. at 795-96.
476. 4 RONALD E. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTrrUTIONAL
LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE (3d ed. 1999).
477. See Shapiro, supra note 254, at 405 (listing the book at number seven).
478. This is volume four, 239-756, excluding Freedom of Association, or 520-68.
479. Id. at 332-61 (the first part of part VI, "The Other Side of the Coin from Prior
Restraint of the Press-Access to and by the Press"), 754-56 (Pacifica, Denver Area, Reno
v. ACLU; under "Obscenity"), 370 (Associated Press), 479-80 (Tornillo), 415, 422-24
(discussing tobacco advertising over broadcast), 313-14 (a footnote section called "Tort
Claims Against the Media, Because of What They Broadcast," though primarily listing
print cases), 428-30 ("Radio and Television Broadcasts of Lottery Results").
480. Id. at 370.
2005]
61
Ammori: Ammori: Another Worthy Tradition:
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2005
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
Freedom of the press from governmental interference under the
First Amendment does not sanction repression of that freedom by
private interests [through conspiracies in restraint of trade] .481
This addition is not necessary to relay facts, as Rotunda also quotes the
sentence following this passage: "'The First Amendment affords not the
slightest support for the contention that a combination to restrain trade in
news and views has any constitutional immunity."' 482 The effect of Rotunda's
addition is to limit Associated Press, apparently by its own terms, to antitrust
offenses. This fails to reveal that scholars and Justices have drawn broad free
speech propositions from this case, finding support in this very passage.
Rotunda bases broadcast access on technological constraints while ac-
knowledging a larger principle. The section on "access to the press" differen-
tiates electronic media from other speech based on technological difference,
i.e., "[d]ue to the unique nature of electronic media and the present state of
the art., 4 83 Rotunda attributes the courts' deference to the FCC and Congress
on broadcast's technological "complexity. 48 4 Nonetheless, he finds the tech-
nological distinction weak. The footnote to this first sentence asserts that
while the Court "has often commented on the monopoly nature of broadcast-
ing, this premise has been attacked," and lists eleven articles and books in
support.485
Rotunda balances the broad principle of access with other considera-
tions. First, he traces broadcast regulation cases and quotes Court language
that "the interest of the listening public in 'the larger and more effective use
of radio"' can override the First Amendment interests of a licensee. 486 This
broad principle is balanced with a quote that radio is "[u]nlike other modes of
expression," and thus "subject to governmental regulation. 48 7
Rotunda implicitly criticizes Red Lion, introducing it as the case that
"brought into sharp focus" the "extent of the right of the government to con-
trol the electronic media. ''488 Despite this perspective, Rotunda focuses not on
"government control," but on the individual's right of access. The FCC, Ro-
tunda explains, "require[d] broadcasters to follow a 'fairness doctrine.'
489
Rotunda's subtle use of the article "a" instead of "the" when joining it to the
term "fairness doctrine," as well as placing the term in quotation marks, taints
the readers' faith in the doctrine. The broadcasters' challenge to the fairness
481. Id. (quoting Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945)) (alteration
in original).
482. Id. (quoting Associated Press, 326 U.S. at 20) (emphasis added).
483. Id. at 332 (emphasis added).
484. Id. at 340.
485. Id. at 332 n.l (citations omitted). Of these eleven, three are by L.A. Powe.
486. Id. at 333 (quoting NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 216 (1943)).
487. Id. (quoting NBC, 319 U.S. at 226).
488. Id. (emphasis added).
489. Id. at 334.
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doctrine was on "conventional First Amendment grounds as abridging free-
dom of speech and press. ' '49° By contrast, Red Lion's rejection of these
grounds was apparently unconventional. The Court, according to Rotunda,
said the right to free speech for broadcasters is not "identical to published or
spoken speech. '49 1 He likened the fairness doctrine to a prior restraint, plac-
ing "a recognizable burden upon broadcaster programming discretion," and
added that Red Lion "spent little time discussing" the "additional burden" and
the fear of broadcaster self-censorship.492
Rotunda frames the access debate on whether a right to access is consti-
tutionally required, whereas the other books ask if legislatures or agencies
could constitutionally permit access. Without discussion, he seems to assume
that limited access rights are permissible: a "carefully drawn statute providing
for limited access" is constitutional.493
Rotunda treats Tornillo, unlike Red Lion, as largely unproblematic.
Tornillo appears in a section in "Traditional Print Media., 4 94 The subsection
heading claims "No Right of Access to Newspapers. '49s Rotunda refers to
those favoring access as promoting "regulation" of the print media.496 To
distinguish print and broadcast beyond technology factors, Rotunda empha-
sizes that broadcast monopolies are legally sanctioned. Without accounting
for the economic peculiarities of information markets, Rotunda trusts that
economic markets will develop newspapers sensitive to readers' wants.4 97
Making a practical argument to downplay access, he argues with a long block
quote (from an article) that access is not as effective as presumed: "those
arguing for government regulation of the print media ... overestimate[] its
effectiveness.
498
Discussing the Turner cases, Rotunda does not focus on the viewers but
on the "speakers." He says the must-carry rules "regulate[] cable speech" in
two ways, burdening cable operators and cable programmers.499 Further, he
characterizes O'Connor's Turner I dissent as "more protective of the free
490. Id. (emphasis added).
491. Id. at 335.
492. Id. at 335-36.
493. Id. at 340 (discussing CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973), and
CBS v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367 (1981)).
494. Id. at 356.
495. Id. Rotunda also discusses Tornillo in a section called "Rights of Reply." The
section, however, mainly discusses the possible constitutionality of retraction statutes, as
opposed to rights of reply, noting that most victims of slander do not want money but to
correct false statements. Id. at 479-80.
496. Id. at 358.
497. Id.; see BAKER, MEDIA, MARKETS, supra note 157.
498. ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 476, at 358.
499. Id. at 350.
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speech rights of the cable operators." 5 He does not, however, call the major-
ity "more protective" of the speech rights of everyone else in society.
The last three pages of the free speech chapter discuss "Sexually Ori-
ented Material on Broadcast and Cable Channels" and "Sexually Oriented
Material on the Internet.",50 1 This is the only sustained discussion of the inter-
net. In addition to his criticism of access, Rotunda embraces papertradition
tenets.5 °2
IV. THE FUTURE OF FREE SPEECH
Much is at stake in teaching law students that electronic media cases are ex-
ceptional, limited to their facts, and supposedly rely only on specific technologi-
cal factors. Paper tradition advocates hope to disburden the "exceptional" broad-
casters and other owners of electronic media infrastructure of restrictions. Being
pro-speech means being in favor of one speaker, an infrastructure-owner, at the
expense of other speakers, and core speech values. More importantly, the advo-
cates hope to foist paper doctrine on all future media, including internet delivery.
The internet is at stake in many ways. The distinction between structural
regulation and content leads to different constitutional decisions. Although both
speech doctrines would approve of the holding in Reno v. ACLU,'°3 that case
merely involved content, not structure, of the internet. It invalidated internet anti-
indecency legislation. So, though Reno v. ACLU is ringing endorsement for the
free speech on the internet, it did not present conflicting private speech (or busi-
ness) interests, like Red Lion and the Turner cases did. Nor as broadband-delivery
does. Cable and telephone companies, and some scholars, argue that the broad-
band-infrastructure-owner should have constitutional rights to consumers' inter-
net speech.5s 4 The Supreme Court will have to determine, once again, if it will
follow communication tradition, or regulate internet delivery like a burning flag.
One hopes that advances in technology make the two traditions converge.
With the advent of the internet, continuing government supervision for broad
access, like in Red Lion, is no longer even arguably necessary, so long as the
internet is kept free through setting the proper regulatory baselines in advance.
505
The debate need not be between continuous government oversight and concen-
trated powerful media companies, so long as the law stops protecting communi-
500. Id. at 352.
501. Id. at 754-56.
502. For content, see id. at 263 n.19 (noting that this is "examined in various sections
throughout this chapter regarding specific topics such as the clear and present danger,
obscenity, and defamation"). For balancing, see id. at 263. For corporate speech, see gen-
erally id. §§ 20:51, 20:3 1.
503. 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
504. See William E. Lee, Cable Modem Service and the First Amendment: Adventures
in a "Doctrinal Wasteland", 16 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 125 (2002).
505. For a good introduction, see LESSIG, supra note 66.
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cation bottleneck masters and gatekeepers and sets proper initial rules.50 6 A focus
on open forms of the intemet could "replace [govemment-]regulated mass media
giants" by connecting all speakers to each other and could "enhance the ability of
all in society to speak creatively and effectively. 50 7 With less powerful gate-
keepers on whom the government can lean centrally, decentralized networks like
the initial intemet should permit less "regulatability" by the government.0 8 This
could satisfy both traditions and result in a realignment of the debate. Ensuring
such open forms of internet, however, requires that regulatory decisions be based
on the technologies, economics, and a conception of free speech that concerns
itself with dispersed speech power and wide viewpoint diversity; not analogies
from pamphlets.
But however one frames the future debates, this is a constitutional debate to
which law students should be invited. The effect of marginalizing socially domi-
nant electronic media in the free speech curriculum is largely to advance one
view of speech doctrine over another-the government distrust over a focus on
society members' ability to participate in communication. A long tradition of
thorough scholarship has attempted to grapple with the complex and important
questions of speech and speech law as they operate in society and affect its mem-
bers.
Neither this scholarly tradition nor entire communications industries should
be ignored. Ignoring these industries merely pushes, by analogy, a doctrinal posi-
tion onto new and old communication media and onto future lawyers and law
scholars. Without studying these issues, students are less able to anticipate future
free speech debates or to contribute to present debates, such as those involving
broadband delivery, the structure of the internet, digital television, Tivo-like ma-
chines, video game consoles used as computers on the intemet, code, copyright,
privacy, wireless and wireline communications, etc. Instead, students should
receive diverse and antagonistic conceptions of free speech doctrine, including
the doctrine applied to society's most pervasive media.
506. Yochai Benkler & Lawrence Lessig, Net Gains: Will Technology Make CBS
Unconstitutional?, NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 14, 1998, at 12, 14.
507. Benkler, Core Common Infrastructure, supra note 67, at 28.
508. Benlder, Siren Songs, supra note 27, at 74 (citing LESSIG, supra note 152, at 19).
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